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Abstract 
 
The existence and magnitude of the largest genocide of the twentieth century, the 
Holocaust, are now being denied by individuals worldwide. This paper analyses the 
European legislation criminalising Holocaust denial from a freedom of expression 
perspective. The paper argues that Holocaust denial is inherently anti-Semitic, and is thus 
consistent with hate speech theory and the hate speech laws that have been enacted 
internationally in an attempt to remedy the harm hate speech can cause. The thesis of this 
paper is that the legislative restrictions on hate speech and Holocaust denial are justified 
from a free speech perspective on theoretical grounds. Such restrictions are a necessary 
prioritisation of human dignity and equality in the circumstances. Explicit Holocaust 
denial laws, while performing an essential symbolic function in European jurisdictions, 
are unnecessary in non-European states, as generic hate speech laws are sufficient to 
capture the harm caused by upper-level Holocaust denial. 
 
Word Length 
 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, appendix and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 14,965 words. 
 
Subjects and Topics 
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Freedom of Expression, or 
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Irving v Penguin Books Ltd and Lipstadt. 
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I Introduction 
 
Led by Hitler during the Third Reich, the Nazis drafted and executed the Final Solution to 
the Jewish Question. Through mobile killing squads and gas chambers at concentration 
camps, Jews were specifically targeted and systematically killed across Europe during the 
Second World War. What was the largest mass genocide of the twentieth century is referred 
to as the Holocaust. Though it took place only seventy years ago, a small section of the 
public is now denying the historically accepted facts of the Holocaust.  
 
Despite being one of most well documented events in history,1 and almost unanimously 
accepted as historical fact, Holocaust denial is a “global and growing phenomenon”.2 
Inextricably linked to this phenomenon is a documented worldwide increase in anti-
Semitism.3 For these overlapping reasons, Holocaust denial is a unique form of expression 
in that it can be framed in two ways: first, as false speech, and second, as anti-Semitic hate 
speech. Holocaust denial is hate speech because it implicitly or explicitly portrays Jews as 
conspirators, who orchestrated the ‘hoax’ of the Holocaust to gain sympathy for their own 
pecuniary and political benefit. While there is an inextricable overlap between the two 
types of speech in this context, the most persuasive rejection of Holocaust denial is through 
its relationship with hate speech.  
 
Holocaust denial is interesting from a legal perspective as it highlights the direct conflicts 
that exist between fundamental human rights: specifically, the right to freedom of 
expression and the protection of human dignity. The criminalisation of Holocaust denial 
by European states is partly an attempt to limit the harms denial can cause. While 
  
1 Lawrence Douglas “Policing the Past: Holocaust Denial and the Law” in Robert C Post (ed) Censorship 
and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation (Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles, 1998) 70 at 70. 
2 Kenneth Lasson “Defending Truth: Holocaust Denial in the Twenty-First Century” in Ludovic Hennebel 
and Thomas Hochmann (ed) Genocidal Denials and the Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011) 
109 at 113. 
3 Dominic McGoldrick and Therese O’Donnell “Hate Speech Laws: Consistency with National and 
International Human Rights Law” (2006) 18 LS 453 at 453. 
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prosecutions under denial laws are relatively infrequent,4 these laws have further symbolic 
importance, and are indicative of society’s intolerance towards racist hate speech. Hate 
speech laws have been used to successfully prosecute Holocaust denial in the absence of 
explicit denial laws. These laws are further evidence of the international legislative trend 
towards the introduction of permissible restrictions on the freedom of expression.  
 
The thesis of this paper is that legislative restrictions on hate speech and Holocaust denial 
are justified on theoretical grounds. Such restrictions are a necessary prioritisation of 
human dignity and equality over absolute free speech in limited circumstances. Explicit 
Holocaust denial laws, while performing an essential symbolic function in European 
jurisdictions, are unnecessary in non-European states, as generic hate speech laws are 
sufficient to capture the harm caused by upper-level Holocaust denial. 
 
Parts II and III of this paper introduce Holocaust denial and outline the fundamentals of 
denial laws, providing examples of denial prosecutions in Germany. Hate speech laws in 
Canada and New Zealand are analysed to determine how consistent Holocaust denial is 
with traditional hate speech theory. The extent to which Holocaust denial would be 
considered hate speech in New Zealand under the Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA) is 
unclear, though it is argued that some Holocaust denial could reach this threshold.  
 
Part IV discusses the three rationales underlying free speech protection: the marketplace of 
ideas, democracy and individual self-fulfilment. The paper argues that hate speech and 
Holocaust denial are inconsistent with these free speech justifications, and thus the 
restrictions hate speech regulation and Holocaust denial laws impose can be defended on 
theoretical grounds. The Canadian case of R v Keegstra5 is analysed as a practical 
application of these three theories. 
 
  
4 Julie C Suk “Denying Experience: Holocaust Denial and the Free-Speech Theory of the State” in Michael 
Herz and Peter Molnar (eds) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012) 144 at 151. 
5 [1990] 3 SCR 697. 
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Part V compares the approaches taken in Canada and Germany when reconciling 
competing fundamental rights. It is argued that the weight given to different rights 
necessarily varies depending on the social and historical context within which the nations 
operate. 
 
Part VI canvases the English defamation trial of Irving v Penguin Books Ltd and Lipstadt.6 
The case illuminates the significance Holocaust denial has in other areas of law, and 
reiterates in a judicial setting the anti-Semitic motivations of Holocaust deniers. The paper 
discusses the criticisms of denial on trial, but argues these concerns should not be 
overstated, given the publicity deniers receive is overwhelmingly negative, and the 
capacity of the laws to serve as a declaration of society’s intolerance of racial hatred. 
 
II An Introduction to Holocaust Denial 
 
The precise definition of Holocaust denial is the subject of debate. Not merely limited to 
outright denial, Holocaust denial encompasses justification, minimisation, negation and 
distortion of the Holocaust.7 Modern Holocaust denial comprises three basic propositions: 
First, while acknowledging that Jews were killed during World War II, deniers assert that 
there was no official Nazi policy to systematically exterminate the Jews.8 Rather, the policy 
was one of deportation and resettlement.9 Second, they assert that the gas chambers at 
Auschwitz and other concentration camps were not used for killing, but for the fumigation 
of clothing.10 Third, deniers argue that the number of Jews killed during World War II was 
  
6 [2000] EWHC QB 115 (see trial transcript, The Nizkor Project “Irving vrs. Lipstadt” <www.nizkor.org>), 
herein referred to as Irving v Lipstadt. 
7 Examples include Paul Rassinier The Drama of the European Jews (Steppingstones Publications, Maryland, 
1975); Arthur Butz The Hoax of the Twentieth Century: The Case Against the Presumed Extermination of 
European Jewry (Theses & Dissertation Press, Chicago, 1976); Austin App The Six Million Swindle 
(Boniface Press, Tacoma Park, 1973). 
8 Andrew E Mathis “Holocaust Denial, a Definition” The Holocaust History Project <www.holocaust-
history.org>; App, above n 7, at 18; Peter Knight Conspiracy Theories in American History: An 
Encyclopedia (ABC-CLIO, California, 2003) at 321; Lasson, above n 2, at 113. 
9 Butz, above n 7. 
10 Mathis, above n 8; App, above n 7, at 18; Knight, above n 8, at 321. 
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significantly less than the historically accepted total of six million, and was in fact 
anywhere between 200,000 and 1.5 million.11  
 
While many who assert these propositions refer to themselves as Holocaust “revisionists”, 
for the purposes of this paper they will be referred to as Holocaust deniers. The term 
“revisionism” suggests a level of academic credibility. The facts of the Holocaust have 
been proven by documentary evidence, innumerable eye witness accounts, and in several 
international courts and tribunals. While many deniers would argue that they are historians 
engaged in legitimate historical inquiry, this is somewhat misguided, given the 
predominant motive of deniers is to disparage the Jewish community. The term Holocaust 
deniers is thus deemed more appropriate. 
A Holocaust Deniers and What They Deny 
 
Holocaust denial, while originating in Europe, has international support.12  This Part of the 
paper proposes to briefly provide examples of deniers worldwide, to illustrate the 
pervasiveness of Holocaust denial. The first major United States Holocaust denier was 
Austin App, a German-American Professor, who published The Six Million Swindle in 
1973.13  The article is strongly anti-Semitic, and puts forward eight “incontrovertible 
points” in denial of the Holocaust. App asserted: “… the charge that Hitler and the Third 
Reich wanted to exterminate all Jews is a totally fabricated, brazen lie!”14  In regards to the 
accepted quantum of Jewish deaths during the War, App declared this a result of “guess 
work” and “shameful unreliability”.15  App’s work, which was published in several 
magazines and newspapers, inspired the establishment of the Institute for Historical 
Review (IHR). 
 
  
11 Mathis, above n 8; App, above n 7, at 18; Knight, above n 8, at 321. 
12 Deborah E Lipstadt Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (Penguin, New 
York, 1993). 
13 App, above n 7. 
14 App, above n 7, at 3. 
15 App, above n 7, at 15. 
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The IHR, established in 1978 with the purpose of denying facts of the Nazi regime, has 
labelled the Holocaust a “Holohoax”.16  According to their website, the Institute’s mission 
is to promote peace and justice through a better understanding of the past, particularly the 
nature of twentieth century war and conflict.17  Founding members of the Institute describe 
themselves as “vigorous” defenders of the right to freedom of expression and the right to 
conduct independent historical inquiry.18  The Institute has received international criticism 
as an anti-Semitic, “pseudo-academic” organisation with neo-Nazi affiliations.19  
 
Perhaps the most notorious Holocaust denier is English writer, David Irving. Irving has 
published approximately 30 books on Hitler and the Second World War and has delivered 
several lectures “revising” the Holocaust.20  In an interview for Italian television, Irving 
declared that Auschwitz was nothing but a “tourist attraction [that] did not have gas 
chambers”,21 and was an “ingenious plan” of the British Psychological Warfare Executive 
to spread anti-German propaganda.22  Irving appeared as a witness during the Canadian 
Holocaust denial trial of Ernst Zundel.23  He gained further notoriety during the English 
defamation trial, Irving v Penguin Books Ltd and Lipstadt.24  The imprisonment of Irving 
(for charges under Austrian Holocaust denial laws) led to a temporary break in Holocaust 
denial activity. Since his release, however, denial has “substantially increased” 
  
16 Richard Evans Lying About Hitler: History, Holocaust and the David Irving Trial (Basic Books, New 
York, 2002) at 148; Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman Denying History: Who Says the Holocaust Never 
Happened and Why do they say it (Updated and expanded edition, University of California Press, Los 
Angeles, 2000) at 10; Anti-Defamation League “Extremism in America: Institute for Historical Review” 
<www.archive.adl.org>. 
17 Institute for Historical Review “About the IHR: Our Mission and Record” (April 2010) <www.ihr.org>. 
18 Institute for Historical Review, above n 17. 
19 Russ Bellant Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party: Domestic Fascist Networks and their 
Effect on US Cold War Politics (3rd ed, South End Press, Boston, 1991) at 43; Anti-Defamation League, 
above n 16; Princeton University “Institute for Historical Review <www.princeton.edu>. 
20 See for example David Irving Hitler’s War (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1977); David Irving The War 
Path (The Viking Press, New York, 1978). 
21 Lasson, above n 2, at 114. 
22 Robert J Van Pelt The Case for Auschwitz: Evidence from the Irving Trial (Indiana University Press, 
Indiana, 2002) at 48. 
23 R v Zundel [1992] 2 SCR 731, see Part III. 
24 Above n 6, see Part VI. 
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worldwide.25 Arguably, this increase is representative of Irving’s influence within far-right 
denial circles. 
 
The controversy surrounding New Zealand historian, Joel Hayward, raised the issue of 
Holocaust denial in New Zealand. In 1993, Hayward received an A+ from the University 
of Canterbury for his Master of Arts thesis on Holocaust revisionism.26  Hayward came to 
the conclusion that there was no evidence of an official Nazi policy to exterminate the Jews, 
that homicidal gas chambers were merely “atrocity propaganda”, and that significantly less 
than six million Jews were killed during World War II.27   
 
In 2000, the thesis became publically available, causing “unprecedented” controversy.28 
The New Zealand Jewish Council requested that the University establish a Working Party 
to determine how Hayward was awarded first class honours for his paper, requesting 
Hayward’s Master of Arts qualification be revoked.29 The Working Party concluded that 
the paper was “seriously flawed” by “methodological failures”, and recommended that the 
University issue an apology to the Jewish Council.30 Despite this, Hayward was not 
stripped of his degree.  While Hayward conceded in his Addendum to the paper the errors 
of fact and judgment made,31 David Irving has praised Hayward’s work as a “landmark in 
  
25 Lasson, above n 2, at 114. 
26 The paper was titled “The Fate of Jews in German Hands: An Historical Enquiry Into the Development 
and Significance of Historical Revisionism”. 
27 As discussed in the Joel Hayward Working Party “Report to the Council of the University of Canterbury 
of the Working Party established to enquire into: the circumstances under which the degree of Master of Arts 
(with First Class Honours) was awarded by the University in 1993 to Joel Stuart Andrew Hayward, on the 
basis of a thesis entitled ‘The Fate of Jews in German Hands: An Historical Enquiry into the Development 
and Significance of Historical Revisionism’’ (20 December 2000) University of Canterbury 
<www.canterbury.ac.nz> at 62. 
28 Jessica Caldwell “Holocaust Consciousness in New Zealand 1980–2010: A Study” (Master of Arts thesis, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 2011) at 56.  
29 University of Canterbury “Hayward Thesis Working Party” <www.canterbury.ac.nz>. 
30 Joel Hayward Working Party “Report by the Joel Hayward Working Party: Executive Summary” (20 
December 2000) University of Canterbury <www.canterbury.ac.nz> at 10, 11 and 17. 
31 Joel Hayward “Addendum: The Fate of Jews in German Hands: An Historical Enquiry into the 
Development and Significance of Historical Revisionism” (26 January 2000) University of Canterbury 
<www.canterbury.ac.nz>. 
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the turning of the tide in favour of historical revisionism.”32  This is illustrative of the 
pervasive, international influence of “revisionist” works, and their capacity to jeopardise 
legitimate historical development. 
 
Later incidents at Waikato University reiterated the impact of Holocaust denial in New 
Zealand. Hans Joachim Kupka, who had been planning his PhD on the German language, 
was found to have made frequent postings of Holocaust denial in a far-right online forum. 
Controversially, New Zealand is the only nation where a Master’s degree has been awarded 
for a paper on Holocaust denial. Caldwell argues that this peculiarity is a result of New 
Zealand’s “apathetic attitude” towards the Holocaust, and strong constitutional protection 
of the right to freedom of expression.33 
 
The prevalence of denial worldwide triggered legal intervention prohibiting Holocaust 
denial and hate speech.  
 
III Holocaust Denial and Hate Speech 
 
Holocaust denial laws are controversial, provoking legal and historical debate. Many 
jurisdictions that do not have laws explicitly criminalising Holocaust denial have hate 
speech legislation, but whether hate speech laws could encompass denial is the subject of 
debate. This Part engages in that debate by providing an overview of explicit Holocaust 
denial laws, and then analyses hate speech legislation in Canada and New Zealand to 
determine the consistency of Holocaust denial with these laws. 
 
The most persuasive argument in favour of Holocaust denial laws is on the basis that 
Holocaust denial is a form of hate speech, and thus should be restricted. Hate speech 
involves insults or denigration directed at a particular group of people, based on a shared 
  
32 As cited in Sean Scanlon “Making History” The Press (Christchurch, 20 May 2000). 
33 Above n 28, at 74. 
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characteristic of that group (such as race, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation).34 
Usually, the speech is targeting an ‘immutable’ characteristic, and thus is one the victims 
have no power to change.35 Hate speech is criminalised because of the perceived harm it 
causes or has the capacity to cause.36 Specifically, hate speech degrades its victims, and 
can cause severe physical and psychological harm.37 Thus, hate speech goes far beyond 
offensive speech, or mere dislike for a group.38 It is intended to capture the upper level of 
degrading and hostile speech.39 
 
Hate speech causes harm not just to individuals, but also to society at large. Primarily, hate 
speech exacerbates existing inequalities in a community,40 through the vilification and 
persecution of minority groups. Victims in minority groups suffer stigmatisation and 
  
34 Douglas M Fraleigh and Joseph S Tuman Freedom of Expression in the Marketplace of Ideas (SAGE, 
California, 2011) at 139; Raphael Cohen-Almagor “Hate in the Classroom: Free Expression, Holocaust 
Denial and Liberal Education” (2007) 114 American Journal of Education 215 at 215; Andrew Butler and 
Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) at 364; 
Laura Leets “Experiencing Hate Speech: Perceptions and Responses to Anti-Semitism and Antigay Speech” 
(2002) 58 J of Social Science Issues 341 at 342; Steven J Heyman Free Speech and Human Dignity (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 2008) at 164; Richard Moon The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of 
Expression (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2000) at 126. 
35 Fraleigh and Tuman, above n 34, at 140. 
36 Ionna Tourkochoriti “Should Hate Speech Be Protected? Group Defamation, Party Bans, Holocaust Denial 
and the Divide between (France) Europe and the United States” (2014) 45 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 552 at 598; 
Susanne Baer “Violence: Dilemmas of Democracy and Law” in David Kretzmer and Francine Kershman 
Hazan (eds) Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against Democracy (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
2000) 63 at 74; Heyman, above n 34, at 165. 
37 Nicholas Wolfson Hate Speech, Sex Speech, Free Speech (Praeger Publishers, Connecticut, 1997) at 2; 
Fraleigh and Tuman, above n 34, at 140; Mari Matsuda “Public Responses to Racist Speech: Considering the 
Victim’s Story” (1989) 87 Mich L Rev 2320 at 2332; Cohen-Almagor, above n 34, at 218; C Edwin Baker 
“Autonomy and Hate Speech” in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds) Extreme Speech and Democracy 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) 139 at 156. 
38 Moon, above n 34, at 127. 
39 Bhikhu Parekh “Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech” in Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds) The 
Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2012) 37 at 40; Holger Reinhardt “The Harm of Holocaust Denial v the Freedom of Expression: 
Hate Speech, and the Legal Response and the Search for a Universal Solution to a Universal Problem” (LLB 
(Hons) thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2011) at 12. 
40 See Fraleigh and Tuman, above n 34, at 162; Tourkochoriti, above n 36, at 598. 
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disempowerment,41 which can develop into feelings of isolation and self-doubt.42 
Furthermore, there is an inextricable connection between hate speech and the commission 
of hate crimes.43 The existence of hate speech, therefore, contributes to a more dangerous 
and violent society. 
 
Holocaust denial is a manifestation of anti-Semitic motivations. Deniers are attempting to 
reduce the sympathy towards Jews arising out of the Holocaust, and are challenging the 
legitimacy of the State of Israel and Jewish suffering.44 Therefore, it is argued that 
Holocaust denial is an attempt to vilify and bring into disrepute the Jewish people, 
consistent with the definition of hate speech.45 Holocaust denial is inherently racist,46 and 
while it exists as a separate issue, it largely overlaps with hate speech considerations.47 
While European states have criminalised denial partly to thwart the resurgence of 
  
41 See Katharine Gelber Speaking Back: The free speech versus hate speech debate (John Benjamins 
Publishing, Philadelphia, 2002) at 1–2; Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan “Introduction” in Ishani 
Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2012) 1 at 5. 
42 See Benjamin Baez Affirmative Action, Hate Speech and Tenure: Narratives About Race and Law in the 
Academy (Routledge, New York, 2013) at 46–47; Wojciech Sadurski Freedom of Speech and Its Limits 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, Massachusetts, 1999) at 195. 
43 Alan Allport Freedom of Speech (Chelsea House, Philadelphia, 2003) at 25; Michael Whine “Expanding 
Holocaust Denial and Legislation Against It” in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds) Extreme Speech and 
Democracy (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) 539 at 543; Anthony Cortese Opposing Hate Speech 
(Praeger, Connecticut, 2006) at 137; Alexander Tsesis “Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech 
in a Democracy” (2009) 44 Wake For L Rev 497 at 516; Butler and Butler, above n 34, at 364; Juliet Moses 
“Hate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression” (1996–1999) 8 Auckland U L Rev 185 at 195; 
Raphael Cohen-Almagor “Holocaust Denial is a Form of Hate Speech” (2009) 2 Amsterdam L Forum 33 at 
37. 
44 See United States Holocaust Memorial Museum “Holocaust Denial and Distortion” <www.ushmm.org>; 
Frederick Schauer “Social Epistemology, Holocaust Denial and the Post-Millian Calculus” in Michael Herz 
and Peter Molnar (eds) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012) 129 at 141, Suk, above n 4, at 144; Anti-Defamation League 
“Holocaust Denial: An Online Guide to Exposing and Combating Anti-Semitic Propaganda” 
<www.archive.adl.org>; Cohen-Almagor, above n 43, at 36. 
45 See Jeremy Jones “Holocaust Denial: ‘Clear and Present’ Racial Vilification” (1994) 10 AJHR 169. 
46 Raphael Cohen-Almagor, above n 34, at 216. 
47 James Weinstein and Ivan Hare “General Introduction: Free Speech, Democracy, and the Suppression of 
Extreme Speech Past and Present” in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds) Extreme Speech and Democracy 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) 1 at 4. 
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Nazism,48 criminalisation of Holocaust denial is now seen as consistent with laws against 
racial and religious hatred.49 
A Holocaust Denial Laws 
 
Explicit or implicit Holocaust denial laws exist in 14 countries. International instruments 
contain provisions relating to genocide denial.50 The only non-European jurisdiction to 
criminalise Holocaust denial is the State of Israel. The proliferation of the creation of these 
laws in Europe began in the 1960s, to combat the resurgence of anti-Semitism.51 While 
some laws deal explicitly with the Holocaust or National Socialist genocide,52 others refer 
to the denial of genocide or war crimes more broadly.53 
 
Unsurprisingly, the most punitive Holocaust denial laws exist in Germany and Austria.54 
This is largely because of the embarrassment these nations face as a result of their role in 
the perpetration of the Holocaust.  Further, there is a desire to thwart the rise of neo-Nazi 
movements.55 The Federal Republic of Germany was founded as an “ideological 
repudiation of the Nazis”.56 Holocaust denial poses a threat to the ideologies of Germany, 
  
48 Whine, above n 43, at 543; Michael J Bazyler “Holocaust Denial Laws and Other Legislation Criminalizing 
Promotion of Nazism” (Podcast, 25 December 2006) Yad Vashem <www.yadvashem.com> at 1. 
49 European Commission “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation of Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms and expressions 
of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law” (2014) 27. 
50 See for example European Union Framework Decision for Combating Racism and Xenophobia. 
51 Robert A Kahn “Holocaust Denial and Hate Speech” in Ludovic Hennebel and Thomas Hochmann (eds) 
Genocidal Denials and the Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011) 77 at 80. 
52 As at 27 September 2014: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Poland and Romania. 
53 As at 27 September 2014: Liechtenstein, Portugal and Switzerland (translated by Michael Whine 
“Expanding Holocaust Denial and Legislation Against It” (2008) 20 Jewish Pol Studies Rev 1. 
54 A maximum sentence of imprisonment of five years and twenty years respectively. 
55 Whine, above n 43, at 543. 
56 Kahn, above n 51, at 78; Rainer Erb “Public Responses to Antisemitism and Right-Wing Extremism” in 
Hermann Kurthen, Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb (eds) Antisemitism and Xenophobia in Germany after 
Unification (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) 211 at 218. 
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and denial laws are an implicit rejection of neo-Nazism. The German Criminal Code 
criminalises public incitement under s 130.57  
 
Broadly, s 130(1) could be considered the criminalisation of hate speech. More specifically, 
subss (3) and (4) criminalise public Holocaust denial. The type of expression that is 
criminalised by subs (4) requires an assault against the human dignity of the victims. Both 
subss (1) and (3) dictate that the expression must be “in a manner that is capable of 
disturbing the public peace”, and subs (4) requires the public peace be disturbed in actual 
fact. Intent to harm others is not required under the section.58  
 
German Holocaust deniers, Ernst Zundel and Horst Mahler, both received sentences of five 
years imprisonment under this Code.59 Mahler, aged 78, is a German former lawyer and 
political activist. Mahler is currently serving a 12-year prison sentence for Holocaust denial 
and other related public incitement charges, and the banalisation of Nazi war crimes. 
Prosecutions such as these demonstrate the highly punitive nature of Holocaust denial laws 
in Germany. However, as demonstrated by Mahler’s numerous convictions, it can be 
argued that these laws do not serve as an effective deterrent against denial activity. 
B Hate Speech Laws: Capable of Dealing with Denial? 
 
In absence of explicit Holocaust denial laws, many jurisdictions have enacted laws 
criminalising hate speech more broadly. This section will analyse the ability of these 
generic hate speech laws to effectively address Holocaust denial. This inquiry is necessary 
to determine whether hate speech laws are sufficient in non-European jurisdictions to 
encompass the harms of denial. 
  
57 See Appendix 1 for the full text: German Criminal Code, s 130(1) (translated by Legislation online 
“Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany English version” <www.legislationonline.com>. 
58 Sebastian Hoegl “Holocaust Denial: One’s Free Expression of Thought or Just Hate Speech?” (LLM 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2008) at 30. 
59 “Holocaust denier in Germany sentenced to five years in prison – Europe – International Herald Tribune” 
The New York Times (online ed, 15 February 2007). 
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1 Is Holocaust Denial Consistent with Traditional Hate Speech Theory? 
 
Holocaust denial is widely considered a subset of hate speech.60 Not only does it deny 
survivors their history,61 it is inherently anti-Semitic,62 and is thus a willful attack against 
Jews based on racial grounds. In this way, Holocaust denial can be viewed as anti-Jewish 
propaganda. Reich argues:63  
 
The primary motivation for most deniers is anti-Semitism, and for them the 
Holocaust is an infuriatingly inconvenient fact of history. … What better way to 
rehabilitate anti-Semitism … than by convincing the world that the great crime 
for which anti-Semitism was blamed simply never happened. 
 
While the majority of academics consider Holocaust denial a type of hate speech, some 
consider denial to be more complex, arguing that hate speech theory does little to “capture 
the harm” of denial.64 
 
This raises the question of whether non-specific, generic hate speech laws are capable of 
dealing with the unique nature of Holocaust denial. While it is accepted that denial is 
inherently anti-Semitic, denial differs from traditional hate speech in that the speech is not 
always targeting an individual based on their Jewish characteristics; much denial is more 
subtle than that. Further, in criminalising Holocaust denial, there is an inherent danger in 
thwarting more legitimate historical inquiry, a danger absent from most other hate speech 
considerations. Teachout captures the distinction:65 
  
60 See Lasson, above n 2, at xix; Cohen-Almagor, above n 43; Cohen-Almagor, above n 34, at 216; Whine, 
above n 43, at 542. 
61 Comment of Arthur Berney in Gerald Tishler “Debate: Freedom of Speech and Holocaust Denial” (1986–
1987) 8 Cardozo L Rev 559 at 573. 
62 Jones, above n 45; David Fraser “‘On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Nazi’: Some Comparative 
Legal Aspects of Holocaust Denial on the WWW” in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds) Extreme Speech 
and Democracy (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) 511 at 519. 
63 Walter Reich “Erasing the Holocaust” New York Times Book Review (online ed, 11 July 1993). 
64 Kahn, above n 51, at 77. 
65 Peter Teachout “Making ‘Holocaust Denial’ a Crime: Reflections on European Anti-Negationist Laws 
from the Perspective of US Constitutional Experience” (2006) 30 Vt L Rev 655 as cited in Christopher Bishop 
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It is one thing to say a state may legitimately censor and punish speech that 
serves to incite racial suspicion and hatred under a law that makes that factor the 
central determining element; it is quite another to say a state may censor and 
punish the exact same speech because the views expressed fail to conform to 
some state-established, orthodox version of history.  
 
Debate over whether Holocaust denial is a type of hate speech largely centres around the 
distinction frequently made between “bare” (or “simple”) denial and “aggressive” denial. 
What these distinctions are attempting to encapsulate is that the definition of Holocaust 
denial is fluid, and exists along a spectrum. Bare denial is similar to quantitative 
minimisation, for example, assertions that the quantum of Jewish deaths during the War 
was 200,000, without making a direct, targeted attack against the Jewish people. 
Aggressive denial would go further, for example, statements that the Holocaust is a 
conspiracy theory created by the Jews to gain sympathy and financial advantage.  
 
While widely accepted that “aggressive” denial is a form of anti-Semitic hate speech,66 
whether bare denial is hate speech is more arguable. Perhaps “bare” Holocaust denial, 
whilst historically inaccurate, does not necessarily contain denigrating or threatening words 
in the traditional sense.67 However, many forms of bare denial would be considered hate 
speech.68 Not all hate speech is transparent.69 By arguing, without more, that only 200,000 
Jews were killed during the War, deniers may be implying that the Jewish people were 
involved in a conspiracy, by misrepresenting or exaggerating the effects of the War on Jews 
to advance Jewish interests.70 Without constituting a direct or targeted attack, this 
“minimisation” or “negation” is inherently anti-Semitic, detracts from Jewish suffering, 
and is an assault on their dignity, consistent with traditional hate speech theory.  
  
“Denying the Undeniable: Holocaust Denial, the Criminal Law, and Free Speech” (LLB (Hons) Research 
Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2007) at 25. 
66 See Lasson, above n 2, at xix. 
67 Kahn, above n 51, at 84–85. 
68 See Parekh, above n 39, at 41–42. 
69 See Parekh, above n 39, at 41. 
70 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, above n 44. 
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Further, Holocaust denial is a subset of hate speech because of the detrimental effects an 
environment of anti-Semitism has on society generally. Holocaust denial can operate to 
demean the existence of Jews, thus fostering an atmosphere of distrust and discrimination. 
In having this effect on the Jewish community, denial is “a precursor to subordination, 
diminishment and ultimately the destruction of a people.”71 This in turn engenders 
inequality in society. 
 
Hate speech legislation and cases in different jurisdictions will be examined to determine 
the consistency of Holocaust denial with traditional hate speech theory. 
2 Canada 
Canada has witnessed a surprisingly high level of Holocaust denial activity. While not 
explicitly criminalising denial, hate speech legislation in Canada has been used to 
successfully prosecute Holocaust deniers. Section 319(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code 
makes the willful promotion of hatred against any identifiable group, other than in private 
conversation, an indictable offence. The enactment of this provision indicated that the 
Canadian Parliament was proactively denouncing racist hate speech, consistent with its 
obligations under art 4 of ICERD.72 
 
James Keegstra was a high school history teacher in Alberta, Canada. Keegstra taught his 
students that Jews were “treacherous”, “sadistic”, “money-loving”, “child-killers”, and that 
they “seek to destroy Christianity and are responsible for depressions, anarchy, chaos, wars 
and revolution.”73 Keegstra was charged under s 319(2) of the Code and initially convicted 
in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench.74 The Alberta Court of Appeal, on the basis of a 
constitutional challenge to s 319(2), overturned the conviction.75 The Government 
  
71 Tishler, above n 61, at 572. 
72 International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, see Luke McNamara 
Human Rights Controversies: The Impact of Legal Form (Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007). 
73 R v Keegstra, above n 5, at 714. 
74 R v Keegstra (1984) 19 CCC (3d) 254. 
75 R v Keegstra (1988) 60 Alta LR (2d) 1. 
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appealed the result to the Supreme Court of Canada, who upheld the constitutionality of s 
319(2) by a narrow majority of 4-3.76 
 
The issue in the Supreme Court was the constitutional validity of s 319(2).77 The Court 
held that the prohibition of hate speech codified in s 319(2) was contrary to s 2(b) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which states that everyone has the fundamental 
right to the freedom of expression. While at first blush this seems obvious, the declaration 
by the Court is significant. The Court is acknowledging that hate speech is a “meaningful” 
form of communication,78 creating a presumption is favour of free speech, in approval of 
the broad scope intended by s 2(b).79 With regards to hate speech, the Court ruled:80 
 
Hatred is predicated on destruction, and hatred against identifiable groups therefore 
thrives on insensitivity, bigotry and destruction of both the target group and of the 
values of our society.  Hatred … if exercised against members of an identifiable 
group, implies that those individuals are to be despised, scorned, denied respect and 
made subject to ill-treatment on the basis of group affiliation. 
 
Thus, the Court held that Holocaust denial was a form of hate speech and harmed individual 
victims and society generally.81 The Court held that the evidence established that Keegstra 
“systematically denigrated Jews and Judaism” during his classes.82 This dicta is consistent 
with traditional hate speech theory. The decision in R v Keegstra largely resolved many of 
the issues surrounding the legitimacy of hate speech legislation, particularly the 
constitutional validity of such legislation when up against freedom of expression 
considerations.83  
  
76 Dickson CJ and Wilson, L’Heureux-Dube and Gonthier JJ for the majority; La Forest, Sopinka and 
McLachlin JJ dissenting. 
77 At 713. 
78 Hilliard Aronovitch “The Harm of Hate Propaganda” in Manjunath Pendakur and Roma M Harris (eds) 
Citizenship and Participation in the Information Age (Garamond Press, Ontario, 2002) 147 at 151. 
79 Aronovitch, above n 78, at 151. 
80 At 777. 
81 At 745. 
82 At 797. 
83 A deeper analysis of the balancing exercise undertaken by the Court will be the subject of Part V. 
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However, a decision of the same court concerning a different provision of the Criminal 
Code overturned the defendant’s conviction for Holocaust denial.84 Ernst Zundel was 
indicted for two charges relating to his publication of “The West, War and Islam” and Did 
Six Million Really Die?85 The former argued that there was an international Jewish 
conspiracy to control the world through bankers and communists, and the latter argued that 
the Holocaust was a “fraud” and the largest deception in history.86 Rather than being 
charged under s 319(2) of the Code, Zundel was charged under s 181, for the willful 
publication of false information likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest.87  In 
making the case, the Crown argued that a segment of the Canadian population were being 
targeted and stigmatised, contrary to the public interest in the maintenance of social and 
racial tolerance.88   
 
Controversially, Judge Hugh Locke in the lower court declined to take judicial notice of 
the Holocaust, in fairness to the defendant, as it would have given the prosecution an 
advantage in proving their case.89 The judgment was appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, and then to the Supreme Court of Canada. At issue was the constitutional validity 
of s 181. 
 
The eight-week appeal generated a great deal of media attention, largely due to Zundel’s 
antics throughout. The Crown had to establish that the material published in Did Six Million 
Really Die? was false. Originally convicted for the publication, the Supreme Court 
overturned the conviction.  The Court held that s 2 of the Charter protects all expression of 
a non-violent form, and the content of that expression is irrelevant because s 2(b) is content-
  
84 R v Zundel, above n 23. 
85 Did Six Million Really Die? was written by Richard Verrall under the pseudonym Richard Harwood.  
86 Marouf A Hasian Jr “Canadian Civil Liberties, Holocaust Denial, and the Zundel Trials” (1999) 21 
Communications and the Law 43 at 48. 
87 Section 181 was an antiquated provision enacted to deal with protecting “great men of the realm against 
false news or tales”, and was not designed to address hate speech, see Friedman, above n 168, at 197. 
88 At 789. 
89 Hasian, above n 86, at 49; Robert A Kahn Holocaust Denial and the Law: A Comparative Study (Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 2004) at 1. 
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neutral. It followed that s 2(b) included expression of minority beliefs, even where the 
majority may find those beliefs to be false.90 The limitation imposed on the right in s 2(b) 
by s 181 of the Code was not justified under s 1 of the Charter.91  
 
Therefore, the provision criminalising the spreading of false news was considered to be 
unconstitutional. The decision in R v Zundel has been extensively criticised. The decision 
has been denounced as “a total victory for Holocaust deniers and a total disaster for 
Holocaust survivors and the Jewish people”.92 Mandel warned that the decision would 
likely “read like, and form part of, Holocaust denial literature itself”.93  
 
The R v Keegstra and R v Zundel decisions raise interesting issues for hate speech laws and 
Holocaust denial. These two cases demonstrate the unique nature of Holocaust denial, in 
that it can be framed as either hate speech or false speech (although by in large there is an 
inherent overlap, whereby most Holocaust denial is both hate speech and false speech). At 
several points throughout the R v Zundel judgment, the Court makes a point of 
distinguishing the case from R v Keegstra. The Court argued that the legislative intent 
behind s 181 was unclear, and, contrary to s 319(2), the aim of the section was not to 
encourage and promote racial and social harmony.94 Contrary to s 319(2), which is strictly 
confined to hate propaganda, the Court held that s 181 was too vague and wide reaching, 
having a potentially “undefined and virtually unlimited reach”.95 Pertinently, according to 
McLachlin J, the harm in R v Zundel was more indirect than the harm caused in R v 
Keegstra.96 
 
  
90 At 732. 
91 Gonthier, Cory and Iacobucci JJ dissenting. 
92 Kahn, above n 89, at 119. 
93 Michael Mandel The Charter of Rights and the Legalisation of Politics in Canada (Thompson Educational 
Publishing, Toronto, 1994) at 369 as cited in Kahn, above n 89, at 96. 
94 At 765. 
95 At 769. 
96 At 774. 
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Zundel was indicted under s 181 of the Code rather than s 319(2) because the Attorney-
General, though sympathetic, refused to grant consent to prosecute,97 believing s 319(2) to 
be unenforceable.98 With hindsight, it is clear that the opposite proved to be true. The fact 
that the willful promotion of hatred was considered a justified limitation but the spreading 
of false news was not speaks volumes about the capacity of hate speech laws to deal with 
Holocaust denial. Though the decision in R v Zundel has faced criticism, it is argued the 
decision was correct. The most persuasive rejection of Holocaust denial is through its 
relationship with hate speech. To criminalise speech purely on the basis of its falsity is to 
impose a substantial restriction on the right to freedom of expression. The willful 
promotion of hatred is a more pressing mischief given the harm it causes, and thus its 
restriction by the criminal law is more appropriate.  
3 New Zealand 
 
The right to freedom of expression is protected by s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (NZBORA). The right is not absolute, and is subject to limitations that can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.99 Few limits on the right exist in 
New Zealand,100 however, any limitations imposed have been accepted with little debate.101  
 
Consistent with other common law jurisdictions, New Zealand has no law explicitly 
criminalising Holocaust denial. The Human Rights Act 1993 makes hate speech on the 
basis of race unlawful.102 Section 61 of the Act (the civil provision) makes unlawful the 
publication, distribution or public expression of matter likely to excite hostility against or 
  
97 Robert Martin “Group Defamation in Canada” in Monroe H Freedman and Eric M Freedman (eds) Group 
Defamation and Freedom of Speech: The Relationship Between Language and Violence (Greenwood Press, 
Connecticut, 1995) 191 at 197. 
98 LW Sumner The Hateful and the Obscene: Studies in the Limits of Free Expression (University of Toronto 
Press, Toronto, 2004) at 172. 
99 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
100 Butler and Butler, above n 34, at 323. 
101 See Grant Huscroft “Defamation, Racial Disharmony and Freedom of Expression” in Grant Huscroft and 
Paul Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights 
Act 1993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 171 at 171. 
102 Sections 61 and 131. 
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bring into contempt a group of persons on the grounds of colour, race, or ethnic or national 
origin.103 Under s 61, intent is irrelevant. Section 131 (similarly worded to s 61) is broader, 
and makes the incitement of racial disharmony a criminal offence.104 In contrast to s 61, s 
131 requires intent to excite hostility or ill-will against, or bring into contempt or ridicule 
any group of persons on the basis of colour, race, or ethnic or national origins.105 
Prosecution under this section requires the Attorney-General’s consent.106  
 
Prior to the introduction of the HRA, s 25 of the Race Relations Act 1971 governed the 
incitement of racial disharmony in New Zealand. Passed following the implementation of 
ICERD, the Act was an attempt to comply with New Zealand’s international obligations 
under art 4 of the Convention.107 While complaints under the Act were common, 
prosecutions were infrequent.108 Like s 131 of the HRA, prosecutions under s 25 of the 
Race Relations Act required the consent of the Attorney-General.109 The only reported case 
under s 25 is King-Ansell v Police.110 The defendant was the leader of the National Socialist 
Party of New Zealand, and distributed 9000 pamphlets containing “inflammatory anti-
Semitic propaganda”.111 The defendant appealed his conviction,112 and the Supreme Court 
granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was based on whether Jews 
were an “ethnic group” for the purposes of subs (1). The Court found that Jews were a 
particular ethnic group under s 25(1), the defendant’s appeal was dismissed, and his 
conviction upheld.113 
 
  
103 Subsection 1. 
104 Punishable by a fine of up to $7000 or a term of imprisonment up to 3 months. 
105 Emphasis added. 
106 Human Rights Act 1993, s 132. 
107 Thomson Reuters Human Rights Act 1993 (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [HR131.01]; Huscroft, above 
n 101, at 203. 
108 Moses, above n 43, at 187. 
109 Race Relations Act 1971, s 26. 
110 [1979] 2 NZLR 531. 
111 At 532. 
112 Police v King-Ansell (Auckland, M 1577/77, 27 June 1978). 
113 At 544. 
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There have been no cases reported under ss 61 or 131 of the HRA. The one prosecution 
under s 131 did not lead to a conviction.114 The precise explanation for the under-utilisation 
of these sections is unclear. Legislation criminalising this sort of speech is symbolic of 
society’s intolerance of racist attitudes,115 and arguably this was the intention of the 
legislature when enacting these two sections. The argument that hate speech is not as 
prevalent in New Zealand as in overseas jurisdictions is compelling, but cannot be 
determinative. This much can be demonstrated from the quantity of complaints of racial 
disharmony lodged at the Human Rights Commission.116 However, no further action under 
the Act was taken with regards to these complaints once the majority of them had been 
referred to mediation.117 This is because complaints that do not meet the threshold in the 
Act fall outside the jurisdiction of the Commission.118 
 
The lack of action taken by the Commission is consistent with the idea that “hate speech” 
captures the very upper level of racist speech. In the 2012 Report to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, it was noted that the majority of complaints lodged 
containing offensive content would be unlikely to excite hostility against ethnic groups.119 
This could indicate that perhaps the threshold requirements in ss 61 and 131 are too high. 
However, the Human Rights Commission has signaled that this high threshold is necessary, 
  
114 In 2008, see Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination “International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of 
the Convention” (2012) CERD/C/NZL/20 at [90]. 
115 Paul Rishworth The Right to Freedom of Expression (2003) as cited in Human Rights Commission “The 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression” (26 October 2010) <www.hrc.co.nz>; Huscroft, above n 101, 
at 210; Human Rights Commission “Section 2 – Civil and Political Rights” (15 December 2010) 
<www.hrc.co.nz> at 132 and 134; Moses, above n 43, at 195. 
116 Once figures have been adjusted to account for the number of complaints on single issues, the number of 
complaints have been consistent: 31 in 2007, 23 in 2008, 30 in 2009, and 21 in 2010, see the Committee on 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, above n 114, at 15. 
117 Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, above n 114, at 15. 
118 Human Rights Commission “Human Rights in New Zealand Today: New Zealand Action Plan for Human 
Rights – Central and Local Government” (2004) <www.hrc.co.nz>. 
119 Human Rights Commission, above n 118. 
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bearing in mind the right to freedom of expression.120 It has been argued that s 131 of the 
Act is therefore “framed to do no more than strictly necessary to implement art 4” of 
ICERD.121 Moreover, the requirement under s 131 that consent of the Attorney-General is 
required is an additional bar on the availability of the offence. 
 
A useful example of the hesitancy to pursue complaints is the Kupka case at Waikato 
University.122 A complaint regarding Kupka’s online denial activism was made to the Race 
Relations Conciliator in 2000. The Conciliator stated that Kupka’s writings were “unlikely 
to incite racial hatred in New Zealand.”123 This is illustrative of the high threshold under 
the Act, and speaks volumes about the capabilities (or lack thereof) of anti-Semitic 
Holocaust denial in online far-right forums to incite racial hatred in New Zealand. 
 
That ss 61 and 131 of the HRA impose a limitation upon the right to freedom of expression, 
protected under s 14 of NZBORA, is not in dispute. Rishworth argues that the justification 
for such limitations, in the context of hate speech laws, is the avoidance of harm:124 
 
It is possible to trace genocide and acts of violence against racial and ethnic 
groups back to the development of attitudes in the community. And if the 
development of attitudes is targeted as a ‘harm’ to be avoided because it makes 
people more susceptible to incitements to violence, or more tolerant of violence 
being perpetrated by the state on racial groups, then the harm avoidance rationale 
can be invoked to justify some speech restrictions. 
 
  
120 In the context of s 61: Easton v Human Rights Commission HC Wellington CIV-2009-485-726, 10 
February 2010 at [25] as cited in Thomson Reuters, above n 107, at [HR61.03]; Human Rights Commission, 
above n 118. 
121 Thomson Reuters, above n 107, at [HR131.01]; New Zealand Law Commission as cited in Huscroft, above 
n 101, at 208. 
122 See Part II. 
123 Winston Aldworth “University passed the buck: conciliator” The Waikato Times (online ed, 14 April 
2000) at 3 as cited in Caldwell, above n 28, at 67. 
124 Human Rights Commission “Human Rights in New Zealand Today: New Zealand Action Plan for Human 
Rights – Hate Expression” (2004) <www.hrc.co.nz>. 
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Whether statements of Holocaust denial would come within the hate speech provisions of 
the HRA is uncertain. New Zealand society is further removed from the immediate history 
of the Holocaust than European states. While it is certainly not being argued that an anti-
Semitic attitude is absent from New Zealand culture,125 arguably anti-Semitism is less 
prevalent given the comparatively lower Jewish population.126 Further, it can be argued 
that the threatened rise of neo-Nazi movements in New Zealand is not as great as in 
European jurisdictions.127 The historical influence of the New Zealand League of Rights, 
an extremist anti-Semitic political group, is minimal.128 However, New Zealand still prides 
itself on being a multicultural society. Therefore, it does not necessarily follow that 
Holocaust denial is less likely to be considered hate speech for the purposes of ss 61 and 
131 of the HRA. 
 
As established in King-Ansell v Police on the predecessor legislation, Jews would be 
considered the necessary “ethnic … group of persons” for the purposes of the Act. As a 
precursor to any analysis into the content of the expression, it must be established under 
both sections that the words or matter were broadcast, published or distributed in public, 
or used in any public place or within the hearing of persons in a public place.129  
 
The analysis would hinge upon, first, whether the written publication or verbal expression 
was “threatening, abusive, or insulting.” This is required for both s 61 and s 131. Under 
both sections, whether the expression meets this threshold is an objective standard, taken 
  
125 See generally Brendan Manning “‘Vile’ desecration of Jewish headstones” The New Zealand Herald 
(online ed, 19 October 2012); New Zealand Herald “Racism mars New Zealand election campaign” The New 
Zealand Herald (online ed, 14 August 2014). 
126 In 2012, the Jewish population in New Zealand was approximately 7,500 (approximately 0.2 per cent of 
the total population), see Mandell L Berman Institute “World Jewish Population, 2012” (2013) North 
American Jewish Data Bank <www.jewishdatabank.org> at 62. 
127 See Huscroft, above n 101, at 199. 
128 Paul Spoonley The Politics of Nostalgia: Racism and the Extreme Right in New Zealand (Dunmore Press, 
Palmerston North, 1987) at 141 and 246. 
129 Section 131(1)(a) and (b); s 61(1)(a) and (b). Note that s 61(1)(c) also includes words which are 
threatening, abusive, or insulting if the person using the words knew or ought to have known that the words 
were reasonably likely to be published in a newspaper, magazine, or periodical or broadcast by means of 
radio or television.  
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from the perspective of the reasonable person within the targeted group of persons.130 Even 
if not threatening or abusive, it is likely that Holocaust denial would be considered 
insulting, which prima facie appears to be a lower threshold, even if interpreted narrowly 
so as not to impinge too greatly on the freedom of expression. Statements that the Holocaust 
was a Jewish conspiracy are likely to be considered insulting to the reasonable Jewish 
person. Even “bare” Holocaust denial (for instance, that only 200,000 Jews were killed 
during the War) could be deemed insulting, given the anti-Semitic nature of even bare 
denial, insofar as such statements detract from the suffering of Jewish people during the 
War. Given that Holocaust denial operates on a sliding scale, it must be recognised that not 
all denial would automatically reach the threshold of threatening, abusive or insulting. 
 
Secondly, the denial would need to either be likely to excite hostility or ill-will against 
Jews, or likely to bring the Jewish people into contempt.131 Under s 131, this includes 
“ridicule”,132 broadening the scope of expression that would come within the section. These 
inquiries are context dependent.133 Section 131 requires intent. The terms hostility and 
contempt are undefined, but it can be assumed that they would be interpreted consistently 
with freedom of expression guarantees.134 Case law prior to the current Act suggests that 
contempt means more than “just ragging, chaffing or robust badinage … it connotes 
belittling and denigrating in circumstances where the humorous aspect takes second 
place.”135  
 
This inquiry largely depends on the likelihood of the potential audience to be influenced 
by the speech.136 It is not enough that the communicator feels hostility or ill-will against 
  
130 See Proceedings Commissioner v Archer (1993) 3 HRNZ 123 (CRT); Human Rights Commission v 
McCarthy (1983) 3 NZAR 450 (EOT); Skelton v Sunday Star Times 12/96 CRT 24/95 as cited in Thomson 
Reuters, above n 107, at [HR61.02] and [HR131.03]. 
131 Note that s 131(1) would require intent. 
132 Section 131(1)(b). 
133 Human Rights Commission “Balance about right, hate speech inquiry told” (5 May 2005) 
<www.hrc.co.nz>.  
134 Human Rights Commission, above n 124. 
135 Neal v Sunday News Auckland Publications Ltd (1985) 5 NZAR 234 as cited in Thomson Reuters, above 
n 107, at [HR61.05]. 
136 Huscroft, above n 101, at 205. 
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Jews; that sentiment has to be engendered in others. Blatantly anti-Semitic and aggressive 
Holocaust denial could perhaps excite hostility or ill-will against Jews, although this is 
uncertain, given New Zealand’s intolerance for anti-Semitic attitudes. Holocaust denial 
could be seen to bring Jews into contempt or ridicule. Holocaust denial (both bare and 
aggravated) minimises the effects and harm of the Holocaust, which arguably creates 
feelings of contempt or worthlessness. Further, it is arguable that denial makes a mockery 
of the Holocaust and Jewish suffering, which could be found to constitute ridicule for the 
purposes of s 131. 
 
However, whether reasonable persons would in fact be influenced by this speech, to the 
extent that hostility is incited, is unclear. Spoonley argues that despite the post-War 
resurgence of anti-Semitism in New Zealand, the far-right are still struggling to gain a 
captive audience for their anti-Semitic views.  He argues the absence of a “popular base” 
of anti-Semitism in New Zealand is the reason for this.137 While Spoonley was writing over 
two decades ago, there is nothing to suggest that anti-Semitic discourse has now moved 
any more from the periphery to the centre of public consciousness. Until a case of 
Holocaust denial comes before the courts it is uncertain to what extent New Zealand hate 
speech legislation would encompass denial statements. 
4 The United States of America 
 
The United States has some of the strictest protections of free speech, taking a more 
“libertarian” approach. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, 
“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech”. In contrast to New 
Zealand and Canadian protections of free speech, United States protections are more 
absolute. While some exceptions to the First Amendment exist, the United States has no 
law prohibiting Holocaust denial, or even hate speech more generally. 
 
Limitations to the First Amendment are narrow and specific. The first exception is the tort 
of libel. Secondly, the clear and present danger test was adopted to ensure that speech was 
  
137 Spoonley, above n 128, at 36. 
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limited only when it presented a “clear and present danger” to society.138 Adopted 
following World War I, this test has limited significance in the modern day.139 
 
Third, a unanimous Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire established the 
fighting words doctrine.140 The Court held that “fighting” words are those that “by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach to the peace.”141 Fighting 
words are restricted not because of their content, but because of their mode of expression.142 
Subsequent courts have made efforts to narrow the scope of this doctrine,143 to those words 
likely to incite a violent response.144 Since Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court has not upheld 
a conviction based on this doctrine.145 
 
Fourth, while content-based restrictions are generally not permitted, limitations may exist 
based on form, in the way of “time, place and manner” restrictions.146 Such restrictions 
must be content neutral, narrowly drafted, serve a legitimate government interest and not 
curtail other avenues of communication.147 
 
Though hate speech is no less prevalent in the United States, no law exists prohibiting such 
speech. Racist speech will not be prohibited based on its content. Unless the speech reaches 
the threshold of one of the above exceptions, there is no legal restriction on its widespread 
expression. Similarly, there is no restriction on Holocaust denial in United States law. To 
be considered ‘fighting words’, the denial would have to be of a violent nature inciting an 
  
138 A real and immediate danger, see Shenck v United States 249 US 47 (1919). 
139 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky and R George Wright Freedom of the Press: A Reference Guide to the United 
States Constitution (Praeger Publishers, Connecticut, 2004) at 20; Thomas Gardner and Terry Anderson 
Criminal Law (12th ed, Cengage Learning, Connecticut, 2012) at 229–230.   
140 315 US 568 (1942). 
141 At 572. 
142 RAV v City of St Paul 505 US 377 (1992) at 393. 
143 Street v New York 394 US 576 (1969); Cohen v California 403 US 15(1971). 
144 Aronovitch, above n 78, at 155. 
145 Gardner and Anderson, above n 139, at 230. 
146 Grayned v The City of Rockford 408 US 104 (1972) at 116. See for example laws passed following Snyder 
v Phelps 562 US 9 (2011). 
147 Ward v Rock Against Racism 491 US 781 (1989) at 804. 
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immediate breach of the peace. Parallels can be drawn between this doctrine and the 
requirement in s 130 of the German Criminal Code (public incitement) that the speech be 
“in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace”.  
 
Interestingly, much of Germany’s Holocaust denial would reach this threshold required by 
the German Criminal Code. However, it is unlikely that Holocaust denial in the United 
States, without more, would constitute “fighting words” for the purposes of United States 
law. The ability of Holocaust denial to reach the threshold of disturbing the public peace 
in Germany and not reach that threshold in the United States is largely contextual. Because 
of Germany’s immediate connection with the Holocaust and the desire to thwart the rise of 
neo-Nazism, the maintenance of “public peace” in Germany may be more committed to 
the complete eradication of anti-Semitism. Therefore, Holocaust denial in Germany is 
likely to be considered capable of disturbing the public peace. Even though the United 
States has one of the largest Jewish populations in the world,148 with less of an immediate 
connection to the Holocaust, it is unlikely that Holocaust denial would automatically incite 
an immediate breach of the peace. Moreover, the application of the fighting words doctrine 
has been significantly reduced in its application to racist hate speech,149 which Holocaust 
denial is most accurately framed as. 
 
Given that the United States is one of the world’s centres for Holocaust denial literature, 
the need for legal intervention to adequately deal with the potential harms of denial is 
pressing. Though there is growing criticism of the First Amendment’s inability to deal with 
hate speech, the fervent protection of constitutional rights in the United States means that 
effective legal regulation of hate speech in the near future is unlikely. 
 
  
148 In 2012, the United States had a population of approximately 5.5 million Jews (approximately 1.7 per cent 
of the total population) behind Israel, with a population of approximately 5.9 million Jews (approximately 
75 per cent of the total population), see Mandell L Berman Institute, above n 126, at 22. 
149 Cohen v California, above n 143 as cited in Michelle L Picheny “A Fertile Ground: The Expansion of 
Holocaust Denial into the Arab World” (2003) 23 BC Third World LJ 331 at 341. 
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5 The Necessity of Holocaust Denial Laws in Addition to Existing Hate Speech Laws 
 
Most jurisdictions that have laws explicitly prohibiting Holocaust denial also have more 
generalised hate speech laws, which begs the question: is there a need for explicit 
Holocaust denial laws, if Holocaust denial can come within existing hate speech 
legislation? Moreover, is having a separate offence for Holocaust denial implying that 
denial would not be covered by generic hate speech legislation? While hate speech laws 
were adopted incrementally across Europe, Holocaust denial laws were enacted in more of 
a “slippery slope” fashion.150 Specific Holocaust denial laws were required in the face of 
the proliferation of denial material as a result of increasing usage of the Internet.151 The 
uncertainty of whether denial would come within existing hate speech laws contributed to 
a desire to specifically criminalise Holocaust denial.152  
 
Having distinct denial and hate speech laws, as in Germany, has not posed any problems 
in application. Section 130(1) of the Code, which deals with public incitement generally, 
appears to require a similar threshold to ss 130(3) and (4), the subsections pertaining 
specifically to Holocaust denial. Both subss (1) and (3) must be “in a manner that is capable 
of disturbing the public peace”, and subs (4) requires the public peace be disturbed in actual 
fact, in a manner violating the dignity of the victims. The penalties under subss (1) and (3) 
are comparable.153 The penalty under subs (4) is slightly less punitive.154  
 
While similar in many respects, the differences between the above provisions raise 
concerns over the “evenhandedness” of the enforcement of racist speech.155 If a lower 
threshold existed for hate speech against Jews than for speech against other ethnic 
  
150 Erik Bleich The Freedom to be Racist? How the United States and Europe Struggle to Preserve Freedom 
and Combat Racism (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011) at 59. 
151 See Bleich, above n 150, at 59; Credence Fogo-Schensul “More Than a River in Egypt: Holocaust Denial, 
the Internet, and International Freedom of Expression Norms” (1997–1998) 33 Gonz L Rev 241 at 242.   
152 Bleich, above n 150, at 59. 
153 A period of imprisonment from three months to five years, and imprisonment not exceeding five years or 
a fine respectively.  
154 Imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine. 
155 Bleich, above n 150, at 60. 
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minorities, then perhaps such concerns would be justified. Under s 130, the “public peace” 
threshold is largely the same. Whether this requirement is satisfied would be highly context 
dependent, and may vary case-to-case.156  
 
The unique historical context explains the existence of explicit Holocaust denial laws in 
Europe, and they are necessary for the symbolic role they play. An assessment of whether 
Holocaust denial is hate speech (for the purposes of various legislative regimes) cannot be 
divorced from the historical and cultural context.157 Even though Holocaust denial would 
likely come within hate speech legislation, the specific criminalisation of denial in Europe 
(and Israel) is symbolic. Banning denial is a legislative denunciation of neo-Nazism and 
anti-Semitism. Holocaust denial laws serve as a reiteration of the historically accepted facts 
of the Holocaust, and safeguard against their recurrence. Particularly in Germany, the laws 
are a necessary acknowledgement of responsibility for the Holocaust. Therefore, this Part 
concludes that explicit Holocaust denial laws are necessary for the specific purpose they 
serve in European states, however, generic hate speech laws are sufficient in non-European 
jurisdictions. 
 
Following this Part’s analysis on the laws prohibiting Holocaust denial and hate speech, it 
becomes necessary to examine the validity of such restrictions from a free speech 
perspective.  
 
IV Hate Speech, Holocaust Denial, and the Justifications for Free Speech 
Protection 
 
The three rationales underlying the freedom of expression are the marketplace of ideas, 
democracy and individual self-fulfilment. This Part introduces the three rationales and 
analyses them in the context of hate speech and Holocaust denial, and concludes that denial 
and hate speech are fundamentally inconsistent with all three rationales. It argues that when 
  
156 Bleich, above n 150, at 60.  
157 See Parekh, above n 39, at 41 and 55; McGoldrick and O’Donnell, above n 3, at 485; Cohen-Almagor, 
above n 43, at 35 and 39. 
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speech does not fulfil any of the rationales for free speech protection, it is justifiable to 
introduce restrictions.  
 
The traditional, absolutist position on free speech has come under criticism.158 Particularly, 
the issues surrounding hate speech have instigated debate as to whether this type of speech 
fulfils any of the theories underlying freedom of expression.159 The denunciation of such 
speech has caused many jurisdictions to enact legislation criminalising hate speech.160 
Historically, legislation prohibiting certain types of expression was passed with the aim of 
preventing war and preserving public peace. More recently, however, these laws suppress 
speech in an effort to protect the “rights of other individuals not to suffer an affront to their 
dignity.”161 This sea change is witnessed most clearly in the context of hate speech 
regulation. 
 
There is conflicting discourse in hate speech jurisprudence. Egalitarian scholars posit that 
absent from hate speech are the necessary features that would demand rigid protection.162 
Conversely, libertarian scholars argue that freedom of speech trumps individual dignity 
and equality.163 
A Truth and the Marketplace of Ideas 
 
The metaphor of the marketplace of ideas originated in John Milton’s Areopagitica and 
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, later to be solidified in Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v 
United States.164 According to Millian thought, society is more likely to uncover certain 
  
158 Wolfson, above n 37, at 1. 
159 Wolfson, above n 37, at 1–2. 
160 See Part III. 
161 James Weinstein and Ivan Hare “General Introduction: Free Speech, Democracy, and the Suppression of 
Extreme Speech Past and Present” in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds) Extreme Speech and Democracy 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) 1 at 6–7. 
162 Wolfson, above n 37, at 1–2.   
163 Baez, above n 42, at 41; Catherine Lane West-Newman “Reading Hate Speech From the Bottom in 
Aotearoa: Subjectivity, Empathy, Cultural Difference” (2001) 9 Waikato L Rev 231 at 244. 
164 John Milton Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the Parliament of England 
(first published in 1644, reprinted by The Floating Press, Auckland, 2009); John Stuart Mill On Liberty (first 
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truths if it promotes a free marketplace of ideas through uninhibited free speech. 
Furthermore, to prohibit an opinion would be to accept the infallibility of the state.  Thus, 
Mill was of the opinion that society should endure even the speech it hates, because in an 
open debate where no opinion has been excluded, the truth will triumph.165 In Justice 
Holmes’ famous dissent, he reiterated many of these ideas:166 
 
… [T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas – that the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their 
wishes safely can be carried out. 
 
Based on this dicta, free speech absolutists argue the marketplace of ideas and the process 
of the pursuit of truth as justification for absolute protection.167 Free speech absolutists 
argue that the best remedy for bad speech is more speech.168 The metaphor suggests that 
ideas are like products. Good ideas will conquer in the market, and bad ideas will be 
defeated.169  
 
An important distinction must be drawn between true and untrue statements, to determine 
the role of each in the market. Historically, governments used censorship to prohibit ‘false’ 
ideas that have now been accepted as fact.170 The United States Supreme Court has 
expressed disagreement over the function of false statements. In New York Times v 
Sullivan, the Court asserted that a false statement can make a valuable contribution to 
  
published in 1859, reprinted by Ticknor and Friends, Boston, 1863); Abrams v United States 250 US 616 
(1919). 
165 As cited in Ronald Dworkin “Foreword” in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds) Extreme Speech and 
Democracy (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) i at vii. 
166 Abrams v United States, above n 164, at 630 (emphasis added). 
167 Allport, above n 43, at 25; Heyman, above n 34, at 64. 
168 See Leon Friedman “Freedom of Speech: Should It Be Available to Pornographers, Nazis and the Klan?” 
in Monroe H Freedman and Eric M Freedman (eds) Group Defamation and Freedom of Speech: The 
Relationship Between Language and Violence (Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1995) 307 at 317. 
169 Laura Beth Nielson Licence to Harass: Law, Hierarchy, and Offensive Public Speech (Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey, 2004) at 28; Jeremy Waldron The Harm in Hate Speech (Harvard University 
Press, Massachusetts, 2012) at 155; Gelber, above n 41, at 29. 
170 Fraleigh and Tuman, above n 34, at 10. 
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public debate.171 Conversely, the Court in Hustler Magazine v Falwell held that “false 
statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function 
of the marketplace of ideas.”172 However, the dicta expressed in Hustler is caveated, insofar 
as the Court acknowledged the need to tolerate some false speech in order to prevent the 
“chilling effect” strict liability would have on the expression of true statements.173 The 
importance of not restricting this type of speech is reiterated by the idea that the 
marketplace is dynamic and “in constant flux” – perhaps some truths are subject to 
change.174  
1 Hate Speech and Holocaust Denial 
 
Holocaust denial is unique in that it can be framed in two ways: first, the expression of 
anti-Semitic hate speech, and second, the espousal of false speech to ‘contest’ historical 
facts. One argument to rebut the second analysis is that Holocaust denial should not be 
protected speech because deniers are merely asserting falsities,175 which provide no value 
to the marketplace of ideas. Thus, a characterisation of Holocaust denial purely as the 
espousal of false speech could potentially remove denial from a marketplace analysis. 
However, the marketplace theory is based on the assumption that decisions are informed 
and made only after “rational deliberation”.176 This suggests that individuals are competent 
to distinguish truth from falsity. Government suppression of “false” speech raises issues. 
There is a risk in the government prescribing one universally applicable truth. Declaring 
certain historical facts about the Holocaust to be true may not be seen as contentious to 
many, given the almost unanimous acceptance of the statistics and figures. But, to do so 
would give the government a supreme power and would assume that truth is constant.  
 
  
171 376 US 254 (1964). 
172 485 US 46 (1988) at 52. 
173 At 52. 
174 Wolfson, above n 37, at 146; Eric Barendt Freedom of Speech (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985) at 8. 
175 For example, assertions that only 200,000 Jews were killed during World War II. 
176 Baez, above n 42, at 50. 
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A more persuasive rejection of the marketplace of ideas theory can be found in analysing 
Holocaust denial as a subset of hate speech. For Mill, the harm that speech may cause is 
not a sufficient justification for its suppression,177 and free speech absolutists argue that 
hate speech regulation injures the operation of the marketplace of ideas.178 However, the 
marketplace theory is fallible. It prioritises the search for truth (to the extent it is even 
possible) over competing values, such as the protection of human dignity.179 Perhaps the 
role of the state is to intervene to prevent harm to minorities;180 if so, this idea would extend 
to the protection of Jewish victims of anti-Semitic Holocaust denial.  
 
Hate speech does not fulfil the marketplace theory. Free speech advocates assert the 
marketplace of ideas theory on the assumption that in the marketplace there exists an “even 
playing field”, where individuals are equal participants.181 This is infrequently the case. 
Access to the marketplace is not “free” and equal.182 Uninhibited freedom of expression 
can operate to disadvantage minorities and the less privileged through unequal access to 
the marketplace.183 It is superficial to assert that the best remedy against evil speech is more 
speech.184 Victims of hate speech and Holocaust denial are not encouraged to “go to battle” 
with their aggressors in the marketplace. Thus, the marketplace ideology can operate to 
reinforce pre-existing inequalities if marginalised minorities are not given an equal 
opportunity to voice their opinions.185  
  
177 Mill, above n 164 as cited in Tourkochoriti, above n 36, at 589. 
178 See Baez, above n 42, at 46. 
179 Gelber, above n 41, at 30; Heyman, above n 34, at 170; Schauer, above n 44, at 132. 
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of Ideas” in the Digital Age” (2011–2012) 43 Lov I Chi LJ 267 at 272. 
181 Cortese, above n 43, at 138. 
182 See Raphael Cohen-Almagor “Introduction” in Raphael Cohen-Almagor (ed) Liberal Democracy and the 
Limits of Tolerance: Essays in Honor and Memory of Yitzhak Rabin (University of Michigan Press, Ann 
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The presumption that all individuals come to the marketplace with rational deliberations is 
redundant when those individuals are victims of hate speech. Specifically, racism biases 
the marketplace. The marketplace theory is incapable of dealing with racist speech, because 
“racism is ubiquitous … often we fail to see it because racism is so woven into our culture 
that it seems normal … racist speech silences the politically weak”.186 Hate speech goes 
far beyond causing mere insult. Racist hate speech silences minorities because of the 
disempowerment victims feel following a targeted attack.  An attack based on a group the 
victim belongs to is a direct attack on a person’s identity. Thus, the marketplace does not 
operate successfully for the victims of racist stereotyping.187 Rather than encouraging 
victims to add their voice to the marketplace, hate speech is a direct attack on victims’ 
identity.188 As members of a minority group, this speech will not empower subjugated 
minorities to speak out against aggressive members of the majority. 
 
Given the unique nature of Holocaust denial, the “silencing” argument is somewhat 
different when applied in this context. Because the Holocaust is nearly unanimously 
accepted as fact, and because society is highly suspicious of anti-Semitic discourse, 
speaking back against Holocaust denial is not speech contrary to the majority’s narrative. 
However, denying facts of the Holocaust and assaulting the dignity of the Jewish 
community automatically puts Jewish victims on the defensive. Responding to Holocaust 
denial requires victims to validate the history of the Holocaust, something that, 
unsurprisingly, they might not believe is necessary. Moreover, responses to denial are 
largely at an academic rather than a social level. Thus, Holocaust denial still operates to 
silence its victims; it merely silences in a different way.  
  
279; West-Newman, above n 163, at 253; Irwin Cotler “Racist Incitement: Giving Free Speech a Bad Name” 
in David Schneiderman (ed) Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Thomson Professional Publishing, 
Canada, 1991) 249 at 254.  
186 Charles Lawrence “If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Hate Speech on Campus” in Mari J 
Matsuda, Charles Lawrence, Richard Delgado and Kimberle Williams Crenshaw (eds) Words that Wound: 
Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (Westview Press, Boulder, 1990) 53. 
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B Democracy and the Democratic Process 
 
Freedom of expression is said to protect, promote and encourage citizen participation in 
the democratic process. In a democracy, the people have control over the government.189 
Alexander Meiklejohn argued that freedom of expression is necessary for citizens to 
engage with political issues to successfully participate in a democratic society.190 Ronald 
Dworkin further argued that freedom of expression is “instrumental” to democracy and 
“constitutive” to its effective practice.191 The United States Supreme Court declared the 
democratic process as the ultimate purpose of free speech, as it assures “the unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.”192 
 
Freedom of expression within public discourse is essential for the maintenance of 
democracy and political pluralism because it enables the communication of diverse ideas 
and fosters “collective self-determination”.193 Thus, the democracy theory of free speech 
is primarily concerned with the ability of citizens to criticise the government and prevent 
abuses of power,194 and to have access to information about political leaders and the 
government to encourage educated and informed decision-making during the voting 
process.195 
  
189 Gelber, above n 41, at 34; James Weinstein “Extreme Speech, Public Order and Democracy: Lessons from 
The Masses” in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds) Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2009) 23 at 25–26.  
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192 Roth v United States 354 US 476 (1957) at 484. 
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above n 174, at 20. 
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1 Hate Speech and Holocaust Denial 
 
Hate speech and Holocaust denial do not fulfil the democracy theory underlying free 
speech protection. The democracy theory is primarily concerned with the protection of 
political speech against the government, but carries less weight when concerned with hate 
speech by private individuals directed at other private individuals.196 Further, if democratic 
governance is the primary rationale, the theory is limited to the protection of political 
speech,197 and would not extend to hate speech. A distinction must be drawn between the 
democratic right of citizens to criticise the government, and hate speech, the target being 
vulnerable victims who often have no political power.198 However, it can be argued that 
Holocaust denial can be conceptualised as political speech, insofar as denier’s may have 
an agenda to further far-right ideologies.199 Regardless, while perhaps carrying more 
weight with regards to government-related speech, it is generally accepted that freedom of 
expression extends beyond just political speech. Justification for this can be found on the 
basis that there is often an inherent overlap between politics and other social and public 
issues.  
 
Dworkin argued that in a democratic society, citizens do not have the right to be free from 
insult or offence.200 However, racist speech provokes racial fears and hatred, and is thus 
antithetical to the social and political pluralism upon which democracy is based.201 If the 
speech is communicated in a society where racial prejudice exists, that society cannot be 
viewed as promoting democracy.202 Moreover, the democratic theory of 
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“majoritarianism”203 may be unsuitable where racism permeates society.204 In such a 
society, Wolfson argues:205 
 
Democratic values are cheapened by this process, since the oppression by hateful 
speech lessens [the] ability [of subjugated groups] to participate on an equal 
basis in the democratic process. Hence, the role of free speech in advancing the 
processes of democracy … is perverted by the words that wound. 
 
Denial organisations206 could be perceived as antidemocratic. Hate speech and Holocaust 
denial do little to encourage equal participation in the democratic process. These and other 
online forums in which denial takes place do not encourage debate. Rather, hate speech 
and Holocaust denial cement existing inequalities and in turn undermine democracy.207 
Therefore, while freedom of expression is a necessary component of democracy and 
collective decision making, hate speech undermines victims’ collective decision-making 
capabilities,208 diminishing the ability of victims to effectively participate in the democratic 
process.  
2 Conflict with other Democratic Values 
 
The right to uninhibited freedom of expression, while essential to democracy, is in conflict 
with other fundamental democratic values. According to Barendt, democracy has a dual 
purpose: it could be interpreted to mean, first, majority rights, or secondly, the inalienable 
rights of all citizens that are incapable of being disregarded by the majority of the day (for 
example, the rights to human dignity and equality).209 Recognition and protection of these 
rights regardless of race or ethnicity is an essential component of democracy.210 This 
  
203 The right of the majority to make decisions. 
204 Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1977) at 236 as cited 
in Gelber, above n 41, at 34. 
205 Wolfson, above n 37, at 84. 
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40  
 
reiterates that democracy is more than a debate about politics; it extends to the governance 
of social relations. Particularly, citizens have a duty in a democratic society to respect the 
personhood of other individuals.211 Restrictions on speech are therefore justified when that 
speech is contrary to democracy.212  
 
Holocaust denial has the ability to threaten democracy by undermining the individual 
dignity of its victims, and thus the “fabric of mutual respect” upon which democracy 
rests.213 This is primarily due to the inherent anti-Semitic character of denial. Denial 
portrays Jews as greedy liars, orchestrating the “hoax” of the Holocaust for their own 
pecuniary and political benefit.214 Such racist slurs denigrate the Jewish people, 
constituting an attack on their dignity. 
 
Competing human rights can come into conflict. Which democratic right should take 
precedence when rights do conflict is contested. Some scholars argue that the right to 
equality and personal dignity should trump the democratic “self-government of a 
nation”.215 Conversely, pre-eminent scholar Robert Post posits that uninhibited freedom of 
speech is indispensable to democracy and thus should take priority.216 Post argues that 
restrictions on freedom of expression simply cannot stand in a democracy.217  
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European legislative, judicial and academic opinion falls largely in favour of the protection 
of human dignity and equality. Drafted following the Second World War,218 the German 
Constitution protects human dignity as the principal value of the nation.219 Other European 
states place similar importance on the promotion of human dignity as a primary value.220 
This could be a result of the continent’s proximity to the War. However, even nations such 
as New Zealand and Canada have enacted hate speech legislation,221 arguably prioritising 
dignity over freedom of expression in limited circumstances.222 
C Individual Self-Development and Self-Fulfilment 
 
The third theory underlying free speech protection is the notion that uninhibited freedom 
of expression contributes to individual self-development and self-fulfilment. Through 
exercising freedom of expression, individuals develop critical reasoning skills and a sense 
of “self”.223 The argument is that any restrictions placed on information an individual is 
able to receive or impart will hinder his or her personal growth and development.224 
Individuals will be prevented from reaching their full intellectual potential if their ability 
to formulate arguments and counter-arguments in the public sphere is circumscribed.225  
Thus, freedom of expression and the process of engagement are essential for reaching self-
fulfilment.226  
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Post argues that in the United States, the First Amendment serves to protect the value of 
self-determination.227 According to Mill, informed and contested speech is vital to the 
process of individual self-development. Therefore, Mill would not necessarily oppose 
racist speech and its ability to contribute toward self-development.228 
1 Hate Speech and Holocaust Denial 
 
The argument from self-fulfilment can be criticised, and arguably has even less 
applicability in the context of hate speech and Holocaust denial. Dicta on personal 
development does not adequately address competing values.229 To assume that individual 
self-fulfilment is the primary purpose of free speech, often at the expense of individual 
dignity and self-worth, is misguided. It is superficial to assume that uninhibited free 
expression is the most effective way to achieve self-fulfilment and personal growth.  
 
A limited argument from self-fulfilment can be made in defence of the denier’s right to 
speak. Perhaps Holocaust denial can be defended on the ground that the deniers are 
maximising their individual self-fulfilment by formulating counter-arguments against 
conventional historical narrative. However, any self-fulfilment Holocaust deniers stand to 
gain from espousing hate speech is limited. Self-fulfilment is achieved by the exchange of 
well-informed ideas in a legitimate debate. It is not achieved by the one-sided delivery of 
distorted historical evidence. Additionally, Delgado stipulates, “[B]igotry, and thus the 
attendant expression of racism, stifles, rather than furthers, the moral and social growth of 
the individual who harbors it.”230 Thus, Holocaust deniers cannot rely in any meaningful 
way on the argument from self-fulfilment as a justification for the protection of their racist 
expression. Furthermore, this limited argument must be balanced against the negative 
effect Holocaust denial has on the self-fulfilment of its victims. 
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Rishworth argues that hate speech laws are justified given the harm hate speech causes its 
victims. Regarding the contribution hate speech offers to individual self-fulfilment, he 
argues:231 
 
… [P]eople should be spared the psychological harm and alienation that might 
follow racist remarks. The harm is not so much in the attitudes engendered in 
others, as in the erosion of self-worth in the victims, their withdrawal from 
society and resultant inequality. 
 
Holocaust denial rejects the history and suffering of the Jewish people. Any effect hate 
speech has on the development of victims’ identity is predominantly negative.232 This 
cannot be seen as consistent with individual self-fulfilment if the victim of hate speech is 
reluctant to talk back. Therefore, the self-fulfilment rationale is not convincing in the 
context of hate speech and Holocaust denial. 
D  The R v Keegstra Analysis 
 
In addition to being the subject of philosophical scholarly debate, these theories carry 
weight in judicial decisions. The Canadian Supreme Court in R v Keegstra233 discussed 
these three rationales for the protection of free speech. The Court argued that s 2(b) of the 
Charter (the freedom of expression) protects:234 
 
[T]he value of fostering a vibrant and creative society through the marketplace of 
ideas; the value of the vigourous and open debate essential to democratic 
government and preservation of our rights and freedoms; and the value of a society 
which fosters the self-actualization and freedom of its members. 
 
  
231 Rishworth, above n 115. 
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Relevantly, the Court acknowledged that hate speech, however, does not satisfy these 
values that would warrant constitutional protection, having only a “tenuous connection” 
with s 2(b) values.235 Particularly, hate propaganda is contrary to individual dignity, 
equality and multiculturalism – values that Canada is committed to.236 The discussion of 
the freedom of expression rationales highlights their influence in both free speech theory 
and case law.  
 
The Court discussed at length the marketplace of ideas theory in the context of the 
defendant’s Holocaust denial. The Court acknowledged the persuasiveness of the theory, 
particularly given the goals of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.237 However, 
the Court ruled that this theory did not provide support for the protection of hate speech; 
speech that the Court found to be characteristically false. The Court argued:238  
 
Indeed, expression can be used to the detriment of our search for truth; the state 
should not be the sole arbiter of truth, but neither should we overplay the view that 
rationality will overcome all falsehoods in the unregulated marketplace of ideas. 
There is very little chance that statements intended to promote hatred against an 
identifiable group are true, or that their vision of society will lead to a better world. 
To portray such statements as crucial to truth and the betterment of the political and 
social milieu is therefore misguided. 
 
This dicta is highly critical of the marketplace theory, and suggests that Holocaust denial, 
as a type of hate speech, hinders society’s search for truth. The Court was of the view that 
where hate speech is involved, it is unlikely that the truth with prevail in the short run. 
What can be taken from the R v Keegstra analysis is the importance of balancing the 
theories underlying free speech with other, competing societal values and goals. 
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E To What Extent Should Speech That Does Not Fulfil any of the Underlying Theories 
of Free Speech be Protected? 
 
An analysis proving hate speech and Holocaust denial inconsistent with the justifications 
for protecting freedom of expression, as this Part has done, calls into question the extent to 
which this type of speech should be protected. The right to freedom of expression is not 
absolute. This Part has argued that it is when speech does not fulfil any of the justifications 
for free speech protection, restrictions on expression are justified on theoretical grounds. 
Such theoretical justifications support the hate speech regulation that has been 
implemented in many jurisdictions and internationally.239 
 
It is put forward that in such situations, it is necessary for a balancing exercise to be 
undertaken. The advantages in protecting free speech must be balanced against the 
“chilling effect” hate speech has on its victims, and the harm it causes.240 Such an approach 
is pivotal in a diverse society.241  This approach is consistent with the balancing exercise 
that has been adopted by courts when assessing the validity of limitations on fundamental 
rights.242  
 
V Reconciling Holocaust Denial with the Right to the Freedom of Expression 
 
That the right to freedom of expression is a fundamental right in liberal democratic societies 
is undisputed.243 However, most jurisdictions acknowledge that the right is not absolute. 
When in conflict with other rights, courts are required to determine which should prevail 
in the circumstances, a principally contextual inquiry. This Part analyses the approaches 
taken in Canada, New Zealand and Germany when reconciling competing rights, and 
  
239 Tourkochoriti, above n 36, at 587. 
240 See Fraleigh and Tuman, above n 34, at 163. 
241 See Tsesis, above n 43, at 499. 
242 See Part V. 
243 Butler and Butler, above n 34, at 307; Regel, above n 196, at 303; Tsesis, above n 43, at 521. 
46  
 
concludes that the existing restrictions are justified as a necessary prioritisation of dignity 
and equality over free speech in the circumstances. 
A  Canada and New Zealand 
 
Limitation clauses in legislation direct that many fundamental rights and freedoms 
guaranteed to citizens are not absolute. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms244 
and NZBORA245 both stipulate that protected rights are subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Inherent in limitation clauses is the requirement that courts undertake a balancing exercise 
when considering the validity of various provisions, and when determining which right 
should prevail when rights are competing. 
 
R v Oakes outlined the balancing exercise to be undertaken by Canadian courts in such a 
situation.246 This test was subsequently adopted by the New Zealand Supreme Court in R 
v Hansen to determine whether a limitation on a fundamental right is justified under s 5 
NZBORA.247 In summary:248 
 
a. Is the limiting measure sufficiently important to justify curtailment of the right or freedom? 
b. Is the measure: 
i. Rationally connected to its purpose? 
ii. Limiting the right no more than is necessary to achieve the purpose? 
iii. Applied proportionately to the importance of the purpose? 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court has assessed the constitutional validity of Canada’s hate 
speech legislation, and by a narrow majority, found it to be a justifiable limitation on the 
right to freedom of expression.  
  
244 Section 1. 
245 1990, s 5. 
246 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
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1 Canadian Supreme Court Application to Holocaust denial in R v Keegstra (per Dickson 
CJ for the majority) 
 
As discussed in Part III, the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Zundel found that s 181 of the 
Canadian Criminal Code (the spreading of false news) was an unjustified limitation on the 
right to freedom of expression. Conversely, the Court in R v Keegstra held that the 
limitation imposed by s 319(2) (the willful promotion of hatred) was justified. The 
balancing exercise undertaken by the majority in R v Keegstra will be analysed in this 
section. 
 
The R v Oakes balancing test was applied in R v Keegstra to determine the constitutional 
validity of s 319(2) of the Code. To determine the scope of the right of freedom of 
expression (under s 2(b) of the Charter), Dickson CJ analysed the values underlying the 
protection of free speech.249 Dickson CJ affirmed the scope of s 2(b) as broad and liberal, 
and rejected a blanket content-based restriction on speech.250 Keegstra’s expression was 
held to be protected by s 2(b) of the Charter.251 
 
The majority first discussed whether the state action had an “objective of pressing and 
substantial concern” in a free and democratic society. The majority found this to be easily 
satisfied, by focusing on the harms that hate propaganda can cause. The incidence of racist 
hate propaganda was seen to be increasing, causing both psychological harm to victims 
(such as humiliation, degradation and emotional damage), and social harms to society 
generally.252 Dickson CJ considered international instruments prohibiting hate speech,253 
and Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism and equality. According to s 27 of the 
Charter, rights must be interpreted consistently with the preservation and enhancement of 
Canada’s multiculturalism. Section 15 of the Charter stipulates that all citizens are entitled 
to equal protection under the law, without discrimination based on, amongst other things, 
  
249 See Part IV. 
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race and ethnicity. Thus, any analysis of the Court must be informed by these 
considerations. Concluding on limb one, Dickson CJ held that the objective in enacting s 
319(2) was of the “utmost importance”.254 
 
The Court undertook a “proportionality” analysis to determine whether the infringement 
constituted a justified limitation under s 1 of the Charter. Dickson CJ acknowledged that a 
s 1 analysis could not be “rigid or formalistic”,255 instead favouring a “sensitive” and 
“flexible” approach.256 Under the Oakes test, the following three prongs must be satisfied 
before the limitation is considered justified: the measure must be rationally connected to 
the objective, it must impair as little as possible the right in question, and there must be 
proportionality between the effects of the measure limiting the Charter right and the 
objective. 
 
The majority held that there was a rational connection between s 319(2) and Parliament’s 
objective of promoting equality, multiculturalism and social harmony.257 Dickson CJ 
rebutted the minority’s concerns that a criminal prohibition of hate speech does nothing 
but give the propagandists undeserved media attention to further espouse their views. 
Dickson CJ stated that the criminal prohibition is symbolic of society’s intolerance of 
hateful expression, and thus would not foster an acceptance of its content.258 For these 
reasons, the first prong was satisfied. 
 
Second, the measure must impair as little as possible on the right to freedom of expression, 
protected by s 2(b) of the Charter. The fact that s 319(2) is a criminal provision made this 
prong of particular concern. Because the provision is limited to public conversations, it 
requires intent, and four defenses are available, the provision was not too broad nor too 
vague, and thus was held to impair the s 2(b) right as little as possible.259 
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Third, there must be proportionality between the effects of the measure limiting the Charter 
and the objective. Dickson CJ did not see the infringement of s 319(2) on s 2(b) of the 
Charter as a serious restriction. The type of speech the provision aims to target is narrow 
and specific, only “tenuously connected” with the theories of free speech.260 Thus, the 
impairment was held to be proportionate.  
 
Therefore, the majority held that although s 319(2) was an infringement on the right to 
freedom of expression, that limitation was demonstrably justified under s 1 of the Charter. 
2 To what extent would Dickson CJ’s analysis apply in New Zealand? 
 
The validity of New Zealand’s hate speech legislation has not been judicially tested, and a 
s 5 NZBORA analysis will not be undertaken in this paper. However, given the 
constitutional parallels between Canada and New Zealand,261 Dickson CJ’s decision in R v 
Keegstra is a useful guide to determine how a New Zealand court might approach a s 5 
analysis in the context of hate speech legislation.  
 
Section 319(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code is a criminal provision, therefore the R v 
Keegstra proportionality analysis is more relevant to s 131 than s 61 of the HRA. The 
Canadian Charter emphasises the importance of protecting equality and multiculturalism, 
stressed by Dickson CJ in his judgment. NZBORA has no equivalent, other that the 
protection of minorities to enjoy the culture of that minority, and a general freedom from 
discrimination.262 Both s 319(2) of the Code and s 131 of the HRA are limited to public 
communication, and require intent. The HRA provides no defences to the incitement of 
racial disharmony, in contrast to the Code, which provides four defences to the public 
incitement of hatred.263 This reduces the likelihood of s131 of the HRA being proportionate 
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under prong 2. However, because s 131 of the Act is more narrowly drafted than s 319(2) 
of the Code, and thus would catch less speech, the disproportionality is less marked.  
 
Extensive reference was made to the Canadian Charter in the NZBORA White Paper, and 
the Charter was hugely influential in the NZBORA drafting process.264 The limitation 
clause in s 5 of NZBORA is identical to the limitation clause in s 1 of the Charter. Given 
the similarities between the two documents, the White Paper intended for New Zealand 
courts to “draw on the rich and developing” Canadian jurisprudence when interpreting the 
Act.265 It is, therefore, unsurprising that the New Zealand Supreme Court in R v Hansen 
adopted the R v Oakes balancing test when determining whether a limit upon a right is 
demonstrably justified. 
 
Given the constitutional parallels between the two jurisdictions and the influence of 
Canadian jurisprudence, it is likely a New Zealand court would approach the balancing 
analysis in a similar way, and would consider the decision in R v Keegstra highly 
persuasive. However, the differences between the two statutory frameworks limit the extent 
to which Dickson CJ’s analysis would apply in a New Zealand context. It is also important 
to note that Dickson CJ was delivering the decision of a narrow majority, and thus the 
issues at stake remain contentious. In any event, given the unwillingness of the Human 
Rights Commission to prosecute complaints, it is unlikely that the courts will have to deal 
with the issue, and thus a consideration of the constitutionality of New Zealand’s hate 
speech legislation is uncalled for at present.  
B Germany 
 
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany protects free speech. Article 5(1) 
stipulates that “every person shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinion in 
speech, writing and pictures …”. Subsection 2 states that these rights shall find their limits 
in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in 
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the right to personal honour. Thus, the right to freedom of expression under German law is 
not absolute. 
 
The relationship between the right to freedom of expression and Holocaust denial came to 
a head in National Democratic Party of Germany v Federal Republic of Germany (the 
“Auschwitz lie” case), heard by the Federal Constitutional Court.266 It should be noted from 
the outset that while a case of Holocaust denial, it was not a case concerning Holocaust 
denial laws per se. The plaintiff was a district association of the National Democratic Party 
(NPD) that invited David Irving to a conference. The Association was informed by the 
Munich authorities that Irving was prohibited from communicating Holocaust denial or 
“revisionism” during his lecture. The NPD filed a constitutional complaint, arguing that 
the decision violated their right to the freedom of expression, protected by art 5(1) of the 
Basic Law. On appeal, the Constitutional Court ruled against the NPD, finding that the 
decision of the authority to restrict the content of Irving’s speech did not violate art 5(1).267 
 
The Court acknowledged that the right to freedom of expression is not an unconditional 
guarantee. The basis of the decision was largely focused on the distinction between fact 
and opinion. The object of art 5(1) is the protection of opinions. Statements of Holocaust 
denial were considered to be (inaccurate) statements of fact, rather than the expression of 
opinion. Statements of Holocaust denial, therefore, could not be seen as pursuing the search 
for truth. Consequently, the Court held:268 
 
… [T]he protection of assertions of fact ends at the point where they cease to 
contribute anything to the formation of opinion that is presupposed in 
constitutional law. From this point of view, incorrect information is not an 
interest worthy of protection.  
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Similar to the approaches adopted by Canada and New Zealand, the Court recognised that 
a balancing exercise must be undertaken when rights are in conflict. This exercise is 
between the basic right which has been restricted and the interest served by the 
restriction.269 In this case, the competing right was the injury to honour of the Jewish 
people, and Holocaust denial was considered an insult inflicted upon this group. The Court 
acknowledged:270  
 
It is true that in this case there is a presumption in favour of free speech. But this 
does not apply for statements which are insults in the formal sense or abuse, nor 
when a hurtful statement is based on factual assertions which are proved to be 
untrue.   
 
Thus, relevant to the balancing exercise was the judicial acknowledgment that Holocaust 
denial was factually false, and therefore entitled to receive a lesser protection under art 
5(1).271 This declaration by the Court is significant, and can be contrasted with the 
reluctance of Canadian courts to take judicial notice of the Holocaust.272 By accepting the 
historical facts of the Holocaust, German courts are denouncing Holocaust denial by 
implying it has no merit in historical inquiry. A second relevant consideration was the 
individual honour and dignity of the Jewish people. In this particular case, the insult to 
honour inherent in Holocaust denial was found to trump the right to freedom of expression.  
 
This decision is indicative of the weight German courts place on protecting citizens’ dignity 
and honour. The right to personal honour and dignity is the preeminent value and “spirit” 
of the Constitution, and often takes priority when rights are in conflict.273 The decision also 
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highlights the perceived harm that Holocaust denial has the capacity to cause. For these 
reasons, the limitation imposed on the NPD was considered to be justified. 
 
What this Part has highlighted is the position courts are faced with when reconciling the 
freedom of expression with conflicting rights. The Canadian Supreme Court in R v 
Keegstra held that hate speech legislation was demonstrably justified. While this decision 
would be persuasive in a New Zealand court, it is unclear whether Dickson CJ’s approach 
would be adopted. Although not explicitly reconciling Holocaust denial laws with the 
freedom of expression in the Auschwitz Lie case, the approach of the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany similarly reiterated the importance of recognising and balancing 
competing rights when determining whether a decision is justified.  
 
Contrasts can be drawn, however, between the competing rights prioritised by the Canadian 
and German courts. The Canadian Court stressed the importance of equality and 
multiculturalism. The German Constitutional Court emphasised the primacy of human 
dignity and honour.  These distinct approaches are coloured not only by the legislative and 
constitutional framework within which the two states function, but also the social and 
historical context the legislative regimes operate within. Germany’s desire to prioritise 
dignity and honour is an acknowledgement of the nation’s responsibility for sacrificing 
these values during the War, and serves to prevent those values from being compromised 
in the future. This reinforces the paper’s thesis that legislative restrictions on hate speech 
and Holocaust denial are justified as a necessary prioritisation of dignity and equality over 
absolute free speech in the circumstances. 
 
VI Denial and Defamation: Irving v Penguin Books Ltd and Lipstadt 
 
In 1996, David Irving sued author Deborah Lipstadt, her publisher, Penguin Books, and 
four London based bookstores for defamation.274 Irving filed suit in an English court, 
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claiming that Lipstadt had defamed him in her book, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing 
Assault on Truth and Memory.275 Broadly, the case was presented to the public as a freedom 
of expression issue, largely focusing on the right of historians to publish their academic 
work.276 What ensued was a three-year long period of discovery,277 and a three month trial, 
putting Irving’s historical methodology directly on trial, and indirectly trying the validity 
of Holocaust denial in an English court. This Part seeks to analyse the claim and the 
judgment, to evaluate the broader significance of the trial for Holocaust denial.  
A David Irving and his Claim 
 
As discussed in Part II, David Irving is perhaps one of the most notorious Holocaust 
deniers. In Denying the Holocaust, Lipstadt’s intention was to “demonstrate how deniers 
misstate, misquote, falsify statistics, and falsely attribute conclusions to reliable 
sources.”278 Lipstadt asserted that Irving was “one of the most dangerous spokespersons 
for Holocaust denial”, and “bends [historical evidence] until it conforms with his 
ideological leanings and political agenda”.279 
 
Irving’s claim was that Lipstadt had defamed him by falsely accusing him of being a 
Holocaust denier and Hitler apologist who distorted historical evidence, thus making a 
direct attack on his competence as a historian and his personal ideological motivations.280 
Irving asserted that the book’s content was an attempt to “silence” him and destroy his 
reputation as a historian, and therefore was defamatory (in the sense that ordinary readers 
would think less of him) under English law. 
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B The Trial and Judgment 
 
Irving represented himself at trial, and it was agreed by both parties and Gray J that the 
trial would judge-alone.281 What was at issue, as Gray J carefully reiterated following the 
trial, was “Irving’s methodology and historiography, not what happened back in the 
[1940s].”282 In this way, he was attempting to ensure that the judgment would not be a 
mechanism to legitimise or delegitimise Holocaust denial more generally. Gray J, who 
presided over the trial, held that Lipstadt’s statements in Denying the Holocaust were 
defamatory.283 In establishing the defence of justification, the defendants had to prove, first, 
that no objective, fair-minded historian could have arrived at the conclusions that Irving 
came to (and therefore he had misrepresented the evidence), and secondly, that these 
misrepresentations were deliberate.284  
 
To prove that Irving misrepresented the evidence, Lipstadt and Penguin Books used the 
testimony of five esteemed historians to discredit Irving’s assertions. The historians found 
Irving’s work to be seriously flawed, and based on lies.285 After outlining the essential 
elements of Holocaust denial, historian Richard Evans canvassed how Irving’s work 
constituted denial.286 The report of Auschwitz historian Robert Jan van Pelt reiterated that 
“overwhelming” evidence demonstrated approximately one million Jews were killed at the 
camp.287 Irving massively understated the quantum of Jewish deaths, denied the existence 
of homicidal gas chambers at concentration camps, and denied Hitler’s knowledge of the 
Final Solution, to the extent there was such a policy. This was accepted by Gray J as 
constituting Holocaust denial.288  
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Notably, Irving was forced to make significant concessions during the trial. In his 
publications, Irving had consistently claimed that there was no official Nazi policy of mass 
Jewish extermination. However, at trial he admitted his error by acknowledging the mass 
shootings sanctioned by Hitler and carried out by the Einsatzgruppen.289 Further, Irving 
ultimately accepted the existence of gas chambers at Auschwitz, admitting that the 
chambers were used for killing Jews “on some scale.”290 Therefore, prong one of the 
defence was satisfied. 
 
To prove the second prong of the defence (that the misrepresentations were deliberate), the 
defendants argued that the cause of Irving’s denials was his anti-Semitism, and put forward 
persuasive evidence to that effect. Defence counsel presented Irving’s diary entries, 
transcripts of his speeches and reports from his website to prove that he was motivated by 
anti-Semitism.291 Proving Irving’s racism was essential to proving he had deliberately 
misrepresented the historical evidence as a result of his ideological prejudices.292  
 
The judge found for the defendants, Lipstadt and Penguin Books, in a 349-page judgment, 
holding that Irving was a racist and an anti-Semite.293 In his conclusion, Gray J stated: “the 
defendants are justified in their assertion that Irving has seriously misrepresented Hitler’s 
views on the Jewish question”, through his misinterpretation and mistranslation of 
historical documents.294 Significantly, Gray J held that the totality of the evidence 
established that large numbers of Jews were systematically gassed at Auschwitz.295 To 
conclude, Gray J held:296  
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… Irving displays all the characteristics of a Holocaust denier. He repeatedly 
makes assertions about the Holocaust which are offensive to Jews in their terms 
and unsupported by or contrary to the historical record. 
 
Following the judgment,297 Irving hired counsel and instructed them to apply for appeal to 
the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal. On 20 July 2001, his application was denied. 
C  The Significance of the Trial for Holocaust Denial 
 
Despite the ruling against him, Irving publically declared that it would not dissuade him 
from future denials.298 Criticising the result as “indescribable … and perverse”,299 Irving 
also declared the outcome “predictable”,300 which begs the question as to why he pursued 
the claim, and what his motivations were for doing so. Following the judgment, Lipstadt 
stated there was never any doubt that she and Penguin Books would be successful:301 
 
… I see this not only as a personal victory, but also as a victory for all those who 
speak out about hate and prejudice. It was a struggle for truth and for memory, 
and a fight against those who sow the seeds of racism and anti-Semitism.  
 
While a defamation trial and not a trial of Holocaust denial, Irving v Lipstadt has broader 
significance for Holocaust denial. Implicit in the judgment is the suggestion that if Irving’s 
work is methodologically flawed, so too is the work of other deniers. This strikes at the 
heart of the historical and legal validity of Holocaust denial. Although historical 
methodology and practice changes over time,302 this judicial denouncement of Irving’s 
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methods of historical inquiry arguably had the effect of publically discrediting Holocaust 
denial.  
 
Further, while referring only to Irving and not to Holocaust deniers generally, Gray J 
acknowledged the anti-Semitic character of denial. This is relevant insofar as it lends 
weight to the argument that Holocaust denial is a targeted, racist attack against Jews, 
consistent with traditional hate speech theory. This declaration speaks volumes about the 
significance of the trial beyond issues associated with defamation.  
 
Perhaps defamation is another legal avenue to discredit denial, one that goes beyond hate 
speech laws and explicit Holocaust denial laws. However, what is ironic is that it was 
Irving, the denier, who was the plaintiff in the case. It cannot be said with any certainty 
that Holocaust denial in and of itself would be sufficient to fall within the tort of 
defamation. 
D  The Criticisms of Denial on Trial 
 
Holocaust denial laws and the legal issues surrounding denial have been criticised, 
challenging the efficacy of prosecuting denial. It is argued by some that when Holocaust 
deniers are involved in a trial (whether being prosecuted, or indirectly as in Irving v 
Lipstadt), the trial is merely a platform from which deniers can communicate their ideas to 
the masses. Trials provide deniers with publicity, and in some instances make them 
“martyrs” for free speech.303 For these reasons, it could be argued that trials of Holocaust 
denial are counterproductive. The Canadian Zundel trials and the Irving trials will be 
briefly considered as examples. 
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The Zundel Canadian trials304 generated a great deal of media attention,305 largely due to 
Zundel’s attempts to attract publicity. Prior to being charged under the Criminal Code for 
the spreading of false news, Zundel was relatively unheard of. Because of the lower court 
judge’s refusal to take judicial notice of the Holocaust, the trial provided Zundel with an 
opportunity to canvas his writings at length, and advance his denial theories in a judicial 
setting. Adding fuel to the fire, Zundel on several occasions wore a bulletproof vest to 
court, declaring he needed protection from angry Jews.306 Attempting to come across as a 
martyr for the freedom of expression, Zundel also wore a helmet with the slogan “Freedom 
of Speech”. As a result of the lengthy trial and Zundel’s antics, Zundel and his Holocaust 
denial achieved a status of national notoriety.307 At a press conference following the trial, 
he declared: “[the trial] cost me $40,000 in lost work, but I got one million dollars’ worth 
of publicity for my cause. It was well worth it.”308 
 
David Irving has received a lot of publicity worldwide as a result of his Austrian Holocaust 
denial trial, as well as the English decision in Irving v Lipstadt. However, it is argued that 
concerns of widespread publicity should not be overstated. The publicity surrounding 
Irving’s trials in both Austria and England was overwhelmingly negative.309 While the 
issue of Holocaust denial may have achieved a presence in ordinary homes through these 
trials, it does not necessarily follow that the public felt any sympathy for Irving, or that 
they saw any merit in his denial claims. 
 
Therefore, the concerns about denial on trial should not be overstated. While it is true that 
a court trial can serve as a mechanism for deniers to get more exposure and publicity for 
their opinions, only in their extremist circles would they gain sympathy as free speech 
martyrs. Trials of Holocaust denial are significant insofar as they represent society’s 
  
304 See Part III. 
305 Hasian, above n 86, at 49. 
306 Hasian, above n 86, at 48. 
307 Evelyn Kallen “Never Again: Target Group Responses to the Debate Concerning Anti-Hate Propaganda” 
(1991) 11 Windsor YB Access Just 46 at 54 as cited in Bishop, above n 65, at 53. 
308 Bazyler, above n 48, at 14. 
309 Bleich, above n 150, at 60. 
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intolerance towards deniers, and implicitly affirm traditional historical narrative, 
reinforcing the argument that Holocaust denial laws perform an essential symbolic 
function. 
 
VII Conclusion 
 
The New Zealand examples of Joel Hayward and Hans Joachim Kupka demonstrate the 
international nature of the problem of Holocaust denial. Not only does denial pose a threat 
to the legitimacy of historical methodology, Holocaust denial laws (and hate speech laws 
more generally) raise several legal issues, particularly the extent to which they infringe on 
the passionately protected right to freedom of expression. This paper has argued that free 
speech theory and the weight of competing rights serve to justify the limits on free speech 
that the restrictions impose. 
 
Holocaust denial and hate speech fail to satisfy the three rationales for free speech 
protection, and thus it is argued that laws criminalising Holocaust denial and hate speech 
can be defended on theoretical grounds. Conceptualised as a type of hate speech, Holocaust 
denial has little to offer the marketplace of ideas. The argument that the best remedy against 
hate speech is more speech has little merit if victims of hate speech are disempowered and 
discouraged from “going to battle” against their aggressors.  Democracy is multifaceted: 
hate speech and Holocaust denial are contrary to the fundamental democratic values of 
equality and individual dignity. Any argument deniers can make from self-fulfilment is a 
limited one, and must be balanced against the damage hate speech does to the self-
fulfilment of its victims. 
 
Interestingly, some states (such as Germany) have legislation criminalising hate speech 
generally, and Holocaust denial more specifically. Theoretical concerns regarding the 
implication that Holocaust denial is therefore not a type of hate speech are unfounded. 
Practical concerns over the evenhandedness in enforcing these sections, it is argued, should 
not be overstated, given the similarities in threshold requirements and penalties. This paper 
has argued that while Holocaust denial would be considered public incitement generally 
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under German law, the explicit criminalisation of Holocaust denial is necessary in 
Germany (and other European states) for the symbolic purpose it serves. In assessing the 
validity of Holocaust denial laws, the historical and social context must be at the forefront 
of considerations involved. Given the continent’s proximity to the War, Holocaust denial 
laws have the function of reiterating traditional Holocaust narrative, and of denouncing 
anti-Semitism and the threatened rise of neo-Nazism. Thus, even if the deterrent effect of 
these laws is minimal, their primary function is being served simply by the laws being on 
the books. 
 
Hate speech laws are sufficient in non-European jurisdictions to capture the upper levels 
of harmful speech. New Zealand’s HRA makes unlawful the incitement of racial 
disharmony, indisputably restricting the right to freedom of expression. Until a case of 
Holocaust denial comes before the courts, however, it is unclear the extent to which this 
type of expression would fall within either section. This paper has argued that Holocaust 
denial would be “insulting” to the reasonable Jewish person. What is less certain, however, 
is the extent to which reasonable persons in New Zealand are capable of being influenced 
by Holocaust denial, a necessary inquiry into the requirement that the expression incite 
hostility, or bring into contempt or ridicule the Jewish people. Given the under-utilisation 
of the two sections, providing reasons by way of analogy is problematic. Decisions of such 
a nature would have to be made by the courts on a case-by-case basis. 
 
The legal significance of Holocaust denial extends beyond the existence and application of 
hate speech and Holocaust denial laws. Irving v Lipstadt highlights the role denial can play 
in the context of the tort of defamation. The judgment is useful in reiterating the anti-
Semitic motivations of Holocaust deniers, and implies that denial is flawed from a 
methodological standpoint. While trials of Holocaust denial have been extensively 
criticised from an efficacy perspective, these concerns should not be overstated, given that 
the publicity denial trials attract is largely negative. 
 
That Holocaust denial is an international issue is clear. That laws criminalising such speech 
are inconsistent with the freedom of expression is also undisputed. While these laws are 
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justified, and in certain contexts necessary, it is less clear how effective they are in actually 
reducing levels of Holocaust denial. Effective education of Holocaust history in tandem 
with legal intervention is required before the desired reduction in Holocaust denial activity 
can be expected.  
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VIII Appendix 1: German Criminal Code 
 
Section 130 Incitement to hatred 
(1) Whoever, in a manner that is capable of disturbing the public peace 
1. Incites hatred against segments of the population or calls for 
violent or arbitrary measures against them; or 
2. Assaults the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously 
maligning or defaming segments of the population, 
Shall be punished with imprisonment from three months to five 
years. 
(2) […] 
(3) Whoever publicly or in a meeting approves of, denies or downplays an 
act committed under the rule of National Socialism… in a manner 
capable of disturbing the public peace shall be liable to imprisonment 
not exceeding five years or a fine. 
(4) Whoever publicly or in a meeting disturbs the public peace in a manner 
that violates the dignity of the victims by approving of, glorifying, or 
justifying National Socialist rule of arbitrary force shall be liable to 
imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine.  
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